Indian documentary covers EV winners
A new short documentary (22 mins) film called The 22nd Century Indian by Shaurya Sinha offers an optimistic take on India, and also covers five (!) Emergent Ventures winners. Congratulations to them, and to Shruti too.
EV India winners featured: Naman Pushp https://x.com/therealnamzoo?s=11
Khushi Mittal: https://khushimittal.com
Shreeporna Rao: https://x.com/shreepoorna365?s=11
Samay Sanghvi: https://www.thealmanac.ai/article/samaysanghvii
Angad Daryani: https://www.linkedin.com/in/angaddaryani?utm_source=share_via&utm_content=profile&utm_medium=member_ios
Thursday assorted links
1. This guy is productive. Yes very productive.
2. “Mercor is building a network of experienced data scientists for potential future projects with leading AI research organizations.” And The New Statesman covers the poetry project.
3. How did the English build such beautiful villages?
4. Two Percent Podcast with Tyler Cowen, fifty-two minutes, we discuss “wellness” too.
5. New Fighting Crime podcast.
6. Does New York need new ornamental architecture?
7. Texas Tech update (NYT).
There are now eight episodes
The Everyday Abundance podcast explores the hidden histories behind everyday activities and the technologies we don’t even know are technologies.
Virginia Postrel and Charles C. Mann dive into the surprising stories behind everything from brushing your teeth to driving your car.
Listen, subscribe, and rate us on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Amazon, YouTube, or wherever you listen to podcasts.
Here is the link, self-recommending of course…
Did UBI make people happier?
Eh, only in the short run:
We study the causal impacts of income on a rich array of employment outcomes, leveraging an experiment in which 1,000 low-income individuals were randomized into receiving $1,000 per month unconditionally for three years, with a control group of 2,000 participants receiving $50/month. We gather detailed survey data, administrative records, and data from a mobile phone app. The transfer caused total individual income excluding the transfers to fall by about $1,900/year relative to the control group and a 4.2 percentage point decrease in labor market participation. Participants reduced their work hours as a result of the transfers by 1-2 hours/week and participants’ partners reduced their work hours by a comparable amount. Among other categories of time use, the greatest increase generated by the transfer was in time spent on leisure. Despite asking detailed questions about amenities, we find no impact on quality of employment, and our confidence intervals can rule out even small improvements. Treated participants broadly increase expenditures, led by spending on non-durable goods and services, with smaller increases in spending on durable goods and human capital. We observe no significant effects on degree attainment, though the magnitudes of the estimated effects generally appear larger among younger participants. Measures of subjective well-being are higher among treated participants in the first year of the transfers but then revert to control group levels. Overall, our results suggest a moderate labor supply effect that does not appear offset by other productive activities.
That is from the QJE by Eva Vivalt, Elizabeth Rhodes, Alexander Bartik, David Broockman, Patrick Krause, and Sarah Miller. Via Matt Yglesias.
My excellent Conversation with Luke Burgis
Here is the audio, video, and transcript. Here is the episode summary:
Luke Burgis left Wall Street after two years, founded a few successful companies in his twenties, then walked away to spend three years in a Roman seminary on the path to the priesthood. He now runs the Cluny Institute and teaches at Catholic University. His book Wanting made René Girard legible to a general audience; the new one, The One and the Ninety-Nine, takes mimetic theory into the dynamics of self and crowd in an age of social contagion.
He joined Tyler to discuss whether the age of pessimism is ending, why the Anglo world in particular seems so unhappy, whether Dostoevsky or Thomas Mann better diagnoses modernity, the kind of reader his own book would ruin, why he thinks AI will make social contagion weaker, what put him off consulting with Anthropic on Claude’s constitution, what effective altruism misses, why men and women are drifting apart, what he’d fund in every American city, the case for reintroducing friction, whether a Gnostic reading of the lost sheep explains our moment, what Rod Dreher gets right about withdrawal, why Genoa is Italy’s most underrated city, what confession times reveal about a church, why Italians seem tired of their Catholicism, why he didn’t become a priest, where he differs from Ross Douthat, why exorcists appear to be on the rise, the sudden mimetic antisemitism on the right, the book his 23-year-old self would have hated, what he secretly admires about Silicon Valley, why Michigan never left him, what the original Cluny can teach a modern talent network, how he hopes to face his own death, what he’ll do next, and more.
Excerpt:
COWEN: I’m not saying you’ll ever do it, but what does your escape fantasy look like? One of mine is I’ll go live in a third-tier city in Mexico. I’m not going to do it, but sometimes I think about it. Cost of living would be very low. The food would be amazing. I could improve my Spanish.
BURGIS: It is moving to Genoa with my family, making my US income, living in Italy. I love Italy. I love the food. I love the people. I love the culture. I feel lighter while I’m there. I laugh more. We eat dinner later. I love everything about it. It would probably be living in Italy for the most part, or at least making that my home base, brushing up on my Italian, working less.
COWEN: Why Genoa? It’s a wonderful city. It’s still medieval, right, in a funny way?
BURGIS: It’s medieval. I think it’s the most underrated city in Italy.
COWEN: In Italy, I mean, yes. I agree. Yes.
BURGIS: I think it’s the most underrated city. You agree.
COWEN: I took my wife there. She was stunned. “How come no one goes to Genoa?” She was telling me.
BURGIS: It’s close to Cinque Terre. It’s this city that’s elevated. It has a fascinating history. It was still a very functional port city. It was really the most important city in Italy, arguably the world, during when Spain was a great power. It’s very cosmopolitan. It reminds me of Marseille a little bit. It’s vertical, breathtaking views. The people there, they’re not very touristy. The Italians there seem indifferent to you as a tourist.
It just feels very, very homey. It’s so close to a lot of other great things in Italy. You can get to Torino relatively easily. That whole area up there, Bra, where the Slow Food movement originated, you’re just in striking distance from everything. Nobody I know that goes to Italy goes to Genoa. I plead with them. I’m like, “Please, just go to Genoa.”
COWEN: I am the exception. My wife sometimes talks of wanting to live in the smaller towns nearby, which we’re not going to do because we’re slated for a third-tier city in Mexico, but we’re not going to do that either. I sometimes think of Northern Italy as a place where there were fewer different dimensions for mimetic desire. That is, more people dress the same. There are fewer status dimensions, maybe less room for eccentrics compared to America. Do you think that’s true, or do you think I’m off base? Paris is a bit like this also. There’s a certain notion of what kind of shoes an Italian man should wear. They wear them, and they’re amazing, and actually more affordable than here. There’s a sameness to some things.
Recommended, and do note Luke’s new book The One and the Ninety-Nine: Forging Identity in an Age of Social Contagion.
Declining Occupations and Career Outcomes in the United States
This strikes me as somewhat less of a problem than I might have thought:
We study long-run career consequences of initial employment in an occupation that subsequently declines. Linking the 2000 Decennial Census to US administrative employment and earnings records through 2020, we follow more than 2.4 million workers. Employment in an occupation that contracts by at least 25 percent is associated with about 5 percent lower cumulative earnings despite slightly more quarters worked. The earnings differential closely matches evidence from Sweden and Norway, although employment adjustment differs. Occupational mobility is substantial but incomplete, while children’s later occupational destinations are much less tied to their household heads’ 2000 occupational-growth categories.
That is from a new NBER working paper from
Wednesday assorted links
1. Human lawyer for AI agents. And more. Come on, all you agents, you need a guy like this!
2. Saloni’s TED talk on medical cures.
3. Has there been a collapse in British pride?
4. Those new service sector jobs? (solving crimes in space)
5. On Celan and new studies of Celan.
6. Stefanie Stantcheva on anger and rising anger.
7. mRNA vaccine progress against cancer, look at those market prices move.
How much can you consistently care about animal welfare?
We explore the welfare costs of the loss of animal life in a consequentialist total utilitarian framework that incorporates the intrinsic value of living beings through their sentience. Moral philosophy and neuroscience define sentience as the capacity for valenced experience. Observable performance on cognitive tests represents a conservative lower bound on sentience under plausible neuroscientific assumptions. We estimate the relationship between cognition and neuron counts to cardinalize sentience. We collect population and neuron data for a wide range of animal species, and aggregate them into a single welfare measure. Across a wide range of parameters, the aggregate sentience losses of animals in the past half century outstrip the sentience gains to humans from population growth by at least 10,000-fold. Breaking even in welfare terms requires assigning a correspondingly small welfare weight to animals. Including the benefits of economic growth to humans does little to change these overall welfare losses.
In my view macro welfare comparisons are most meaningful when gains from trade are possible, which of course holds across humans, and also holds across humans and (some) dogs. I believe we should act to boost the welfare of non-human animals at the margin, but cannot make the larger comparisons across the totals. We are, inevitably, on the side of the humans and we are not obliged, as welfarists, to commit collective suicide to replenish the biodiversity of the earth.
The title of the paper is the somewhat misleading “The Intrinsic Valuation of Biodiversity Loss.” The authors are
Capitalizing untethered AI agents
That is my latest piece of writing, co-authored with Sonia Farrell Pearson of Harvard. Here is the opening premise:
As early as 2017, the European Parliament floated “electronic personhood” for robots. More recently, a handful of U.S. states introduced legislation explicitly barring AI from legal personhood; and early this summer, President Milei of Argentina proposed letting AI agents own, manage, and bear responsibility for their own corporations.
In response to Milei’s announcement, Yuval Noah Harari pointed out that we have no way of holding an AI agent accountable. What, he asks, could we do to an entity which has neither money to lose nor a body to incarcerate? As Shruti Rajagopalan, a Senior Research Fellow at George Mason’s Mercatus Center, explains: AI “can act intelligently, but only humans respond to the incentives the law creates”.
This question matters now: there are already ways an agent could become fully untethered. By “untethered” – a central concept in this essay – we mean that there is no meaningful or actionable way to trace the actions back to a legally accountable human or institutional entity.
For one, people can and do set agents free, on purpose. An agent could be created by a human or a company that intends to monitor it but then dies or disappears. Or perhaps the entity that created the agent is based in a country like North Korea, not reachable by standard laws.
In other cases the agent might not need to “escape” at all: the agent could be ‘controlled’ by a shell corporation that, while formally owned and traceable, provides no true defendant or ability to satisfy claims. Or perhaps a process spawns a chain of agents so long that the actions of a subagent can’t be tied to the original agent’s creator, neither epistemically nor meaningfully. Even if we can identify the model’s original creator, what if it’s been finetuned, or merged with another model that was created by someone else? The law might eventually untangle these kinds of complex cases, but we foresee an intermediate period where it does not.
And then there’s the user, who makes choices about what the models should actually do. The Hugging Face incident was unusual in that OpenAI was both the model’s creator and its user. But now close to a billion people use these systems: when blaming the creator is legally inappropriate, will it always make sense to blame the user?
The essay considers to what extent capitalizing the untethered agents — requiring them to hold a certain amount of capital — can serve the end of better alignment. About 22 pp., published on Sonia’s Substack, definitely recommended.
Some fertility and AI forecasts
The 2024 forecast is particularly pessimistic about China’s fertility prospects. Both projections produce very substantial global aging, a major global capital glut producing very low long-run real capital returns. The latest forecast entails 10% lower global GDP in 2100 and far higher payroll tax rates to fund old-age benefits. Most important, it entails a major change in the course of economic hegemony with China’s 2100 global GDP share falling from 25.6% to 14.9% and the US share rising from 11.2% to 14.4%. Our results are sensitive. Should the US eliminate all future immigration, its 14.4% global 2100 GDP share would drop to 9.2%. And were global fertility to follow the UN’s low variant, 2100 world output would be one third, not one tenth lower. The level and division of global output is also highly sensitive to the speed at which AI expands frontier technologies. Accelerated AU/AI – 4x faster-than-recent growth in capital’s share through 2050 – or Transformative AU/AI – 10x faster capital-share growth – reinforce demographic forces, ensuring long-run US economic hegemony. Indeed, Transformative AI combined with 2024 demographics implies US and Chinese 2100 global GDP shares of 25.3% and 16.9%, respectively.
That is from a new NBER working paper by
Tuesday assorted links
Why Aren’t Modernist Bridges Awful?
The public dislikes modern architecture but, generally speaking, they do not dislike modern bridges. Lists of the most awesome, most stunning, most beautiful bridges in the world will mention classics like London’s Tower Bridge, the Brooklyn Bridge, or the Rakotzbrücke but alongside them they will picture the Kubitschek Bridge in Brazil (Shutterstock).
The Rio-Antirrio Bridge in Greece:
or the Moses “Bridge” in the Netherlands.
Whether you like these bridges or not, I don’t see in the literature an idea that modern bridges are all ugly or that modern bridge building has failed or fallen behind the great bridges of the past in the way that there is such a critique for modern architecture in general.
Why is this? I have a theory, which is that bridge designers come from engineering schools rather than schools of architecture. It is possible, of course, that there is something in the nature of bridges that prunes the design space in a way that attracts beauty–maybe we like catenaries, arches, cables in tension and beauty is just a byproduct of the engineering.
It is possible, however, to produce ugly bridges so it’s not just an engineering constraint. Moreover, one small but telling piece of evidence in favor of my theory is that most of the bridges chosen by Wallpaper magazine, an architecture magazine specifically, are in fact ugly (and with no overlap in the bridges from my first category of “popular” beautiful bridges). Here are a few, judge for yourself:
The fact that modern bridges are often beautiful, especially when they come from engineers, is consistent with Samuel Hughes’s argument that ugly has been a choice, not a constraint.
Morocco facts of the day, Morocco is not hopeless
For decades, South Africa was the great success story of African industrialization. Last year, Morocco took the lead, emerging as the African Development Bank’s top-ranked industrial economy in Africa. In the Bank’s analysis, published in the latest edition of its industrialization index, Morocco’s growth has been “driven by sustained industrial upgrading, export diversification, and strong industrial policy.” Since the mid-2000s, it has leveraged its location and dominant phosphate reserves to get free trade agreements with the US, the EU, and fifty other countries: the Kingdom would like Morocco to be to France what Eastern Europe is to Germany, or what Mexico is to the US: an export-base “workbench.”
Having positioned itself to profit from the shift to clean energy supply, Morocco is nimbly pivoting its auto manufacturing sector to build EVs, working with incumbents like Renault and Stellantis, and is host to Africa’s first battery gigafactory. That single 70 gigawatt-hour battery factory in Casablanca is expected to supply a third of Europe’s current market. Last year, the government approved construction for a new green hydrogen industrial park, aiming to produce ammonia, steel, and industrial fuel worth a total of $32.5 billion. It has also been strategic in focusing its industrial strategy on aerospace manufacturing, with Airbus becoming a strategic partner, along with investments from Boeing, Thales, and Safran. Its aerospace exports more than tripled in the decade to 2024, to reach almost $3 billion.
Here is the full piece by Kate Mackenzie and Tim Sahay.
How economics is changing
As a proportion of the literature, research about econometric theory, monetary policy and corporate governance has slumped. Meanwhile, papers on development, crime and gender are on the up. This could perhaps be because of changing intellectual interests, or maybe demand-side pressures, such as policymaker priorities and external funding…
Research from Prashant Garg, a postdoctoral researcher at Bocconi University, and Thiemo Fetzer, economics professor at Warwick University, finds causal claims in economics have jumped. In 1990, 7.7 per cent of claims made in the literature were causal. In 2023, that hit 32.6 per cent. Additionally, papers with more causal claims are more likely to receive citations and wind up in top five journals, the research suggests.
Here is more from Harvey Nriapia at the FT.
Monday assorted links
1. Where do the great American comedians hail from?
2. General thoughts on biosafety.
3. “Violet Hensley Dies at 109; Ozarks Fiddler Made Opry Debut at 99” (NYT). She also handcrafted 73 fiddles, appeared on The Beverly Hillbillies, and considered bluegrass too modern for her. She had nine children as well.
4. Which campaiging politicians are using AI the most, and other issues?
6. Tommy John, RIP (NYT).
7. China is hoping to influence the AIs through data supply (NYT).