Is there a Balkan fertility paradox? (from my email)
The Balkans may be the only region other than central Asia where fertility has increased from 2015 to 2026.*
All of the highest fertility rates in Europe are in the Balkans. As of 2024: Montenegro (1.8), Bulgaria (1.73) Moldova (1.73), and Serbia (1.64) are top four. France was next at 1.61.
Other balkan countries were generally about 1.5 (Slovenia, Croatia, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Slovakia), comparable to the highest non-gallic TFRs in Western Europe: Britain (1.55) and Ireland (1.47).
The lowest Balkan countries (Macedonia, Romania, Albania, and Hungary) sit at ~1.35-1.4, which would be lowish for Western Europe, but extremely high for Southern Europe or the former Warsaw pact/USSR.
During the post-soviet nadir, the Balkans had perhaps the lowest fertility in Europe. The rates rose circa 2010, and have recently continued to slowly rise.
Ostensibly similar cultures/economies have no parallel increase (Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, and the Baltics).
I don’t have any theory that would explain this pattern. Balkan men are famously unhelpful husbands and fathers, and the Balkans aren’t any more religious than Poland, Italy and Belarus.
What could possibly be the deal?
That is from Thomas Hanes.
The future of warfare? (from my email)
As weapon systems increase in effectiveness, they will generally target one another rather than humans. Lower loss of life will ease conflict entry and hinder exit.
Warfare will veer further from industrial competition into techno-industrial; the current appearance of parity between low tech and advanced actors reflects near zero deployment of advanced systems. As these deploy, their martial advantages will present clearly.
The need for advanced ecosystems will lead to blocs able to combine human capital, techno-industrial capacity, and inputs. Logistics may be contested at elevated levels, changing the incentives around geographic size and increasing the value of inputs.
Blocs may well engage in near constant warfare of various intensity levels. Bloc composition will be necessity driven, perhaps with increased fluidity.
That is from an anonymous reader.
Saturday assorted links
1. Possibly AI-written pieces that have won literary awards.
2. HuggingFace co-founder on what happened, very good post.
3. What do private insurers want from a Hormuz agreement?
4. GPT Pro on burrito price worries.
6. Do people listen to female economists more?
7. North Korea might be growing at 3.5% (Bloomberg).
*Restoring Childhood: How to Set Kids Free in the Age of Anxiety*
That is the new book by Peter Gray, and it is very much a whole philosophy of child-rearing and also antidote to the current panic over social media. Excerpt:
In preparation for this chapter, I spent weeks poring over the research literature pretaining to smartphones, social media, and teen mental health. It is clear to me that there is something close to a consensus among scientists most immersed in this research, which includes the following three conclusions: (1) Extensive research refutes the theory that effects of smartphones and social media account for a meaningful portion of the decline in teen mental health in the years following 2010. (2) Smartphones and social media can have both beneficial and harmful effects on teens’ mental health, which tend to cancel out when averaging. (3) Future research should focus on understanding better the ways teens use these tools and how to help them maximize the benefits and minimize the harm.
Note that teen suffering also hit a peak around 1990 by many measures, yet that cannot have been caused by phones or social media. And European teen suicide rates were falling just as those in the United States were rising. This evidence is considered in further detail of course.
Recommended, it is both easy to read and substantive.
What I’ve been reading
1. Mike Jay, Wireheads: An Unnatural History of Technology in the Brain. Much of this story is told through the lens of the accompanying science fiction and non-neuro trends in other parts of science. An excellent book, substantive on every page, and it will make you want to read some of the works he cites.
2. Vasily Grossman, From the Front Line, Stalingrad-Treblinka-Berlin 1941-1945. Self-recommending, the best third of this volume is just stunningly good. You do not have to read the whole thing, as there is some degree of repetition.
3. Forough Farrokhzad, Let Us Believe in the Beginning of the Cold Season. She died in a car crash in 1967 at the age of thirty-three, but it turns out she was an amazing poet. I usually do not enjoy poetry in translation, but this is so fiery and full of passion that I am happy to recommend it. Surely in the original Farsi it is better (and quite different?) yet.
4. André Breton, Nadja. It is short, and fun enough to read. But one learns most books from the past are not masterpieces, and that surrealism as a movement — most of all in painting — was more important than the literary outputs of surrealism. Nadja, to me, sounds like a drag. Which is fine. But. What does Breton really think he is immortalizing here? At the end he writes “Beauty will be CONVULSIVE or not at all.” I do appreciate Breton for his understanding of Mexico, and for his cultivation of Haitian art.
5. Emma Southon, Servus: How Slavery Made the Roman Empire. A very good and aggressively readable book about how terrible slavery was in the Roman Empire. A useful corrective to other sources as well. While my general view is that interpretative disputes over antiquity are difficult to resolve, I find her interpretations more intuitive and more convincing than the other side of the debate.
The Queen song ’39
I only recently learned what it is really about, namely very rapid travel into space and time dilation mattering for the return voyage.
I had never before listened carefully to the lyrics. I heard the “’39” reference at the beginning, the mention of volunteeers sailing away, and the general nostalgic British music hall mood to the piece, and assumed it concerned the Second World War. But no, the volunteers sailing away are going to the stars, and their eventual return to the Earth will be for them a sad and tragic event, as everything they had known will be gone. You can listen to the song here.
Here is one of the most direct excerpts:
In the year of ’39 came a ship in from the blueThe volunteers came home that dayAnd they bring good news of a world so newly bornThough their hearts so heavily weighFor the Earth is old and grey, little darling, we’ll awayBut my love, this cannot beOh, so many years have gone though I’m older but a yearYour mother’s eyes, from your eyes, cry to me
Here are the full lyrics. Brian May, who wrote the song, is not only a wonderful guitarist but he has a PhD in astrophysics.
p.s. no synthesizers!
Friday assorted links
2. “Books that Tyler Cowen probably would like.”
3. The tenure dismissal of Sanjay Reddy (NYT).
4. Dell and Rambachan NBER video on the economics of AI. I have yet to view, but “self-recommending.”
5. Anton Leicht on AI and how the concentration of power will evolve. Very good piece.
6. Universities would prefer not to.
7. Which polities can you really trust?
AI and Marginal Revolutions in Wastewater Treatment
An interesting paper from French economists, including recent Nobelist Philippe Aghion, looks at the savings from a predictive machine-learning model applied to wastewater treatment:
This paper studies the environmental effects of a specialised AI aeration-control system deployed across French wastewater treatment plants operated by a global leader in water supply services. Exploiting quasi-experimental variation in both the timing of adoption and outages, we estimate the causal impact of AI on electricity use, carbon emissions, and energy expenditures. We find that full-time AI control reduces plants’ electricity consumption and carbon emissions by 5.4% and 6% respectively, and energy expenditures by 8.2%, resulting in negative abatement costs, while also improving water effluent quality. The additional electricity demand generated by AI models represents less than 1% of these savings. Beyond these effects, AI-equipped plants prove more resilient to high operational stress during extreme meteorological events and chemical pollutant peaks. They also improve load management by reallocating electricity consumption from peak to off-peak hours. Finally, we use the DICE model to assess the aggregate implications of our findings
in three diffusion scenarios. We find substantial global welfare gains from the CO2 reductions associated with this industrial AI use case.
One annoyance: The authors frame the paper as a contrast to worries about AI’s energy use and environmental impact. But those objections are almost entirely innumerate and pretextual and casting the paper as a rebuttal lends them more credibility than they deserve.
One note: Don’t misread the “less than 1%” line as being in the same units as the 5.4%, 6%, and 8.2% figures above it — it isn’t a comparable percentage-point offset. It means the AI system’s own electricity draw is a rounding error next to the savings it generates.
More generally, the effect of AI will be through many, many improvements of this nature.
My excellent Conversation with Julia Ioffe
Here is the audio, video, and transcript. Here is from the episode summary:
Julia joined Tyler to discuss why so many of Russia’s great constructivist painters were women, why the tsarist government established women’s medical courses in 1872, changing attitudes towards abortion and birth control in the 20th century, why the Soviet regime turned prudish, how Khrushchev’s plan to “replace the dead” institutionalized single motherhood, Russian superwomen, why Jewish men were a prized commodity amid rampant antisemitism, the cultural significance of flowers, why a few Russian names still dominate, why Russian women think Western feminists have their priorities backwards, how gender attitudes and autocracy feed into each other, three underrated Russian novels, what she wants to write about next, and more.
Excerpt:
COWEN: I’m sure you’ve noticed that quite a few American men will marry Russian or Soviet women, but not so many American women want to marry Russian or Soviet men. It’s a kind of market test, right? Why exactly are the men so bad? Why are they such louts? Maybe that’s a rude way to put it, but surely in one’s mind, one asks that question, right?
IOFFE: It’s a question that a lot of us who were living in Moscow in the late aughts and the teens were asking that all the time. I remember a friend of mine, a male Western TV correspondent, saying, “The women are so gorgeous here, but the men are so ugly and unfashionable.” He had lived all over the place and worked all over the place, and he said, “I’ve never seen such disparity,” and it was true.
The women like me, Western women who were living and working in Moscow at the time, said, “We’ll just wait till we get home.” I think it’s because of what I talked about before, or what you and I talked about before, which is that so many men were killed in the first half of the 20th century, and so few demands were placed on them because they were seen as an endangered species, in general. They were a resource to be fought over and protected.
In 1968, when the West was undergoing a sexual revolution, and women were fighting for more rights, more equality, the Soviets were talking about saving the men, protecting the men, and saying, “We’ve done enough for the women, but our men die young.” That’s after a lifetime of alcohol abuse, smoking, being largely irrelevant in the home, and obviously politically, because it’s a totalitarian system, so let’s work on protecting them.
Soviet men, and then Russian men, became these coddled, spoiled children essentially, where on one hand, so little was asked of them that it’s the bigotry of low expectations. So little was asked of them, and very little was expected of them, and they rose to meet those very low expectations.
On top of that, the idea of what made a man a manly man in Russia is he’s physically strong, but he dies a young death, or he dies an early death. He drinks a lot, he smokes a lot, he’s reckless, he’s careless, and takes a lot of risk, and that usually means an early death. If you have fewer men to begin with, and as a Russian woman, you see them dying early, and you’re fighting over them, what is the impetus for men to take care of themselves, to act better, be better, if there’s always going to be a beautiful, super competent woman to take him if you don’t want him?
COWEN: These points you’re raising, historically, do you feel it’s been quite different for Soviet and Russian Jews or the same?
IOFFE: I think it’s a little bit different. The caveat is, and I hate that I have to say this, Jews are people too, and subject to the same social forces that everybody else is, but culturally, Soviet Jews were more educated as a rule, more urban, and culturally came from a very family-centric tradition. Russian women, actually, for all the intense antisemitism in the Soviet Union, in Russia, Jewish men were actually a prized commodity for Russian women.
COWEN: With ethnic Russian women?
IOFFE: Yes. Ethnic Ukrainian women, you name it, because the cultural stereotype was that Jewish men don’t drink, they don’t hit you, they are family-focused, family-oriented, they’re involved fathers, they bring their money home, they don’t waste it at the bar or on bottles of vodka with their buddies. That’s the kind of man you would want as a husband. Ironically, the same polls that will tell you that Russians would want their daughters to marry a Jew will tell you that they don’t want their president to be a Jew.
One of my favorite episodes of the year, interesting throughout, and I very much enjoyed Julia’s book Motherland: A Feminist History of Modern Russia.
Solve for the (Refine) equilibrium
We’re proud to announce that Refine has signed partnerships with two leading publishers in economics. Both the American Economic Association and the Econometric Society now use Refine’s AI-assisted technical verification as part of their publication processes.
Here is the thread. And more comments here.
Thursday assorted links
2. New publication on AI and institutions. Good people involved.
4. What kind of machine can a book make?
5. Longevity firms push for medical deregulation in Montana (WSJ).
6. OpenAI Economic Research Exchange.
7. Victor Niederhoffer obituary. Do not forget Victor also was a world class checkers player, art collector, and a very good jazz bassist as well (yes I have heard him play) in addition to his other achievements.
The Binmen of Birmingham
I was on the British CapX Podcast talking about the Equality Act, riffing off my two posts Equality Act 2010 and The Apples and Oranges Tribunal. One thing I discussed in the podcast which I haven’t blogged on is the amazing Birmingham dustbin dispute.
In 2010 an employment tribunal ruled that Birmingham City Council had discriminated against thousands of female workers — cooks, cleaners, care assistants, caretakers — who were denied bonuses paid to the mostly male binmen, gardeners, and gravediggers. Why were the binmen given bonuses? Well, refuse collection is filthy, heavy, outdoor work and not many people want to be gravediggers. Thus, these jobs command a premium for exactly the reason Adam Smith gave in 1776 — compensating differentials. Or was it sexism? Well, note first that there is nothing stopping women from becoming “binpersons” and indeed there are female binpersons and they earn the same bonuses as their male counterparts (just as with the Next case). Moreover, we can test the sexism versus compensating differentials theory. Let’s see what happened.
Here’s the problem, which contributed to Birmingham going bankrupt in 2023. The council employs roughly 400 binmen and something like 6,000 women in comparable graded roles. Every extra pound paid to a binman therefore implied about fifteen pounds owed to the cooks and cleaners. The council simply didn’t have the money to pay everyone binman wages so they cut the binmen’s wages. But the market wage for collecting rubbish is what it is, so when Birmingham finally deleted the premium in January 2025, the binmen went on strike — and they are still on strike, nearly eighteen months later. The rubbish piled up, 17,000 tonnes of it, and the city declared a major incident.
Here’s the most amazing part. The council hired an outside contractor to take over its rubbish collection and it now pays roughly triple its pre-strike outsourcing bill–more than it was paying its own employees. So much for sexism. Apparently the premium wasn’t a favor to men; it was the price of the job. If you want your rubbish picked up and your graves dug, you must pay the market wage. This was pure regulatory arbitrage, of course. Because the new binmen were contractors they legally had a different employer than the Council’s female caregivers and the Act’s comparator rules stop at the employer’s nexus.
The government mandarins, of course, want to close the “loophole” adding yet another bureaucratic requirement to push the equal pay madness up the supply chain. The rubbish piles up.
Will U.S. cities face a knock-on fiscal crisis from the feds?
Federal money flows to cities in three flavors: direct transfers, indirect transfers, and what we call fiscal dark matter. Direct transfers are exactly what they sound like — money sent directly from the federal government to various localities. These include funds disbursed through programs like the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), which supports things like public infrastructure and neighborhood services.3 In 2022, direct transfers like the CDBG totaled $146.3 billion.4 That’s significant, but actually the smallest of the three categories.
Less visible are the indirect transfers. These monies are initially awarded to state governments, which then allocate funds to municipal-level programs and services in accordance with state prerogatives. The cleanest example is probably K-12 education, which receives federal Title I dollars to pay for teachers and programs, but federal highway dollars work essentially the same way. All told, in 2022, the federal government handed down $1.1 trillion to state governments. That amounted to 36% of overall state revenue for that year and, depending on the individual state, ranged from roughly 22% to 50% of state revenue. How much of that ultimately flowed down to cities is hard to say, which is itself a problem: it’s difficult to even establish how exposed local governments are to a pullback in federal support of state budgets.
The third category – our fiscal dark matter – is all the federal money spent into local communities that never shows up in a local budget. This includes housing subsidies like the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) and Section 8. It also includes food support programs like SNAP and even some direct funding for local food banks.
Rightfully or not, when the flow of federal money in this category starts to dry up, the resulting problems will fall squarely on the mayor’s desk. After all, the median voter is never going to see increasing numbers of homeless encampments and think to blame the head of HUD.
Here is the full piece by Jeff Fong.
Who Pays for Unions?
If unions raise worker wages, who pays? We provide a comprehensive assessment of firm responses to increased unionization, using changes in the tax deductibility of union dues in Norway as a quasi-exogenous source of variation in firm-level union density. In the average private sector firm, higher union density raises labor costs and leads firms to contract employment and production, lowering profits without increasing the labor share. The incidence is shared: consumers bear part of the cost through higher prices, shareholders through lower profits, and the remainder is offset by productivity improvements. The total wage bill falls, with losses concentrated among less-attached “outsider” workers. Firm responses vary systematically by the degree of market competition. In manufacturing, where firms operate in less competitive product and labor markets, the response is reversed: the average firm expands employment and production, reduces labor markdowns, and does not experience profit declines. Instead, higher labor costs are largely passed on to consumers through higher prices, with the remainder offset by productivity gains. Workers benefit as both wages and employment rise. These patterns suggest that unions can offset employer monopsony power and that firm responses–and therefore who ultimately bears the cost-depend importantly on market structure. Overall, unionization in this setting primarily redistributes from consumers rather than shareholders and has effects that differ sharply across firms, including a reallocation toward larger and more productive firms. We rationalize these patterns using a partial-equilibrium model of union bargaining with product- and labor-market power.
That is forthcoming in the QJE by Samuel Dodini, Anna Stansbury, and Alexander Willén.
Wednesday assorted links
1. A catalog of past AI predictions.
2. Jasmine Sun on why people do not want data centers. And Jasmine Sun on Ezra Klein, on data centers (NYT).
3. A bot running an SF retail boutique? (NYT)
5. On the NYC grocery store plan.
6. New credit card gives you tokens instead of miles.
7. Does AI mean the end of math heroes? Some other heroes too?