The economics of investment expensing

In July 2025, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act made 100% equipment expensing permanent after two decades of temporary bonus depreciation. I evaluate this reform in a general-equilibrium heterogeneous-firm model with collateral constraints and nonrefundable tax deductions. When matched to U.S. tax-return and Compustat moments, the model yields three findings. First, permanent expensing raises long-run capital by 4.5% and output and real wages by 1.1%, roughly double the gains without financial frictions. Per present-value dollar of forgone corporate tax revenue, expensing builds 5.6 times as much capital as a tax rate cut, versus 3.4 times without financial frictions. Second, first-year capital purchases are U-shaped in firm age: young constrained firms and mature profitable firms expand, whereas unconstrained middle-aged firms whose investment exceeds taxable income delay purchases. Third, making expensing permanent gives up countercyclical bonus depreciation; enacted at the onset of a recession, a two-year bonus offsets 44% of the five-year investment drop.

Here is the paper by Doruk Gökalp, who is on the job market this year from NYU.

Wednesday assorted links

1. Chinese AI companies way down in value.

2. Allison Schrager is starting a podcast with Ken Rogoff.

3. Extensive survey of students on AI.

4. Robert Lynch on lookism.

5. New version of Claude Blattman.

6. Seb Krier on the Christiano interview.  The whole dialogue over this interview is a good example of why we have needed (and not really received) a peer-reviewed tier to the discourse on these aspects of AI safety.  A more rigorous argument really needed to be forced here.

7. Poland foiled a Kaliningrad operation?

Was Achilles Conscious?

Homer’s Greeks had no inner life. That’s the title of a recent introduction to Julian Jaynes’s bicameral theory of mind. To recap: in The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, Jaynes argued that intelligent behavior preceded introspective consciousness. People could speak, learn, farm, build cities, and solve problems without mentally representing themselves as an “I” deliberating within an internal world.

In Jaynes’s theory, routine behavior followed habit but difficult or unfamiliar situations triggered “command hallucinations,” voices experienced as gods, ancestors, or rulers giving instructions. One part of the mind issued commands; another obeyed—hence “bicameral.” Increasing complexity, migration, and the breakdown of established authority undermined the bicameral mind. Starting around 1200 BC, roughly between the Iliad and the Odyssey, people increasingly began imagining alternatives and narrating their own actions within an internal mental space, in short, they became conscious. Consciousness was thus not a biological given but a product of cultural and linguistic evolution.

I used to dismiss Jaynes’s theory completely, The idea of otherwise normal but unconscious human beings seemed absurd. Today, I am not so sure. If you think AIs are not conscious, then a central premise of Jaynes’s theory becomes much more plausible: namely, a civilization of thinking, talking doing, but unconscious beings. The AIs are an existence proof. That said, I still find the evidence for a sharp break around the Homeric era weak. Linguistic differences between the Iliad and later texts are a weak reed for such a big claim and can be explained in other ways. The case for a near-universal transition in a few centuries is thin. On Occam’s-razor grounds I favor continuity. The fact that some animals appear conscious pushes in the same direction.

AIs also undermine Jaynes’s theory in one way. Jaynes bases part of his theory on a change in the way people spoke—moving from describing their actions in terms of following commands to describing their actions in terms of deliberation and “I.” But if AIs are not conscious, then non-conscious beings can describe what they are doing in conscious terms. Of course, AIs have human culture as a foundation, which the early non-conscious humans would not have had, so I don’t think this is a strong hit on the theory.

Still, Jaynes’s theory is that until very recently most humans lacked introspective consciousness. Does this mean that they couldn’t suffer or didn’t deserve moral consideration? I would think not, but it raises the question of what kind of consciousness are we looking for in AIs? Are AIs as conscious as Jaynes’s Achilles? If we can debate whether Homeric era humans were conscious, it’s no surprise that we have difficulty deciding whether AIs are or could be conscious.

In What Did We Learn from Torturing Babies I wrote about the era when doubts about babies’ capacity to feel pain helped justify surgery without anesthesia. Babies certainly behaved as if they felt pain, but a theory overrode the plain observations. That seems crazy if you take behavior seriously as evidence of experience—a broad Turing-test approach. But taking that approach seriously also suggests AIs might well be conscious.

Ultimately, the issue is not whether Jaynes was right or wrong but the fact that there is any debate at all is telling. We don’t have a good test for consciousness whether applied to the past, to other animals, or to machines. If we are unsure whether Achilles had an inner life perhaps we should be unsure whether Claude has an inner life.

Me on the cyberattacks

Tyler Cowen: Don’t Be Fooled By Randomness

The problems are serious, but the sky is not falling in. When it comes to the recent service outages, keep a few points in mind.

First, cyber risk is considerably higher than it used to be. Due to progress in AI systems, cyber offense has outraced cyber defense. Plenty of experts are attesting that a wide variety of systems can be hacked using advanced AI agents.

Second, not every reported incident is a cyberattack. In many cases we do not know, or somebody knows (one way or the other) and is not telling us. One possibility is that these are normal service outages but the world is paying more attention, so the number of problems appears to be spiraling out of control. Another is that institutions are patching or upgrading their systems to limit future cyberattacks, and something in the upgrade goes wrong, causing an outage.

For instance, Microsoft’s November 12 outage, the FAA’s November 13 ground stop, and JPMorgan Chase’s November 16 outage all seem to have been something other than direct cyberattacks.

Do not be too ready to look for patterns in the data, and recall the title of Nassim Taleb’s book: Fooled by Randomness.

Third, the risk of a larger and costlier AI-driven cyberattack remains real. The United States has redundancy and protective systems built into its national security establishment, its financial institutions, and its basic infrastructure. But those protections are imperfect, and with enough attempts somebody might break through and cause real damage.

We do need an emergency national emphasis on cyber defense, but in the meantime do not get carried away by anecdotes. Scrolling social media is not the best way to process this information. Instead, keep in mind that cybersecurity has been a big problem for a long time.

That is from a broader Free Press symposium.

What should I ask Alexander Mikaberidze?

He is the author and the new and excellent The Louisiana Purchase: The Grand Bargain and the Making of America.  He also wrote The Napoleonic Wars: A Global History, one of my favorite history books.  He has extensive other writings on the history of the Russian military during that same period.

From Wikipedia:

Alexander Mikaberidze (Georgian: ალექსანდრე მიქაბერიძე; born 27 January 1978) is a Georgian lawyer, author and historian who specializes in Napoleonic studies. He is a full professor of history and social sciences at Louisiana State University in Shreveport, where he holds the Ruth Herring Noel Endowed Chair for the Curatorship of the James Smith Noel Collection, one of the largest private collections of antiquarian books, prints, and maps in the United States. In 2025, he was granted the Boyd Professorship, the highest and most prestigious academic rank awarded by Louisiana State University.

He is a scholar and historian in the very best old-fashioned sense of the term, one of the most underrated writers and scholars today.  So what should I ask him?

Tuesday assorted links

1. Luka has become a very good player.  Defense is much better too.

2. No comment.

3. Did England bribe Scotland into political union?

4. Survey article on the economics of mental health, one of the most important and understudied areas.

5. Science isn’t just a series of lucky accidents.

6. Kalshi five-year productivity growth contract.  Go trade!

7. Center for Human Progress, now inaugurated.

The economics of Jensen Huang

Most of my assessment is very positive, but I will excerpt this bit from my latest Free Press piece:

Finally, the company was not built to withstand Huang’s departure. Too much authority and knowledge were concentrated in his hands, as evidenced by his practice of having about 60 different people reporting directly to him. Whatever you may think of that system as a day-to-day routine, it can turn disastrous when the person at the top leaves. No one else has collected and interpreted the information those 60 subordinates have imparted to the CEO. We will see how his interim successor Colette Kress does, but there is a great danger that a lot of the contextual understanding of the company and business departed with Huang.

Again, all those direct reports may have worked wonderfully when things were going great, but as a more general practice it is not resilient. Another way to put the point is that the very best CEOs make themselves at least partially dispensable, rather than indispensable. So a large share price decline, following Huang’s resignation, is a sign of his failures as well as his successes. As one set of commentators wrote recently: “the company was never built for him not to be there.”

And one of the very best Ben Thompson columns (gated!) is on Huang and Nvidia.

Monday assorted links

1. Some Henry Oliver book reviews.

2. Washington Monthly’s The Reader, book reviews.  And High Line, a new publishing house for disfavored books.

3. Inflation-indexed bonds around the world.

4. Garett Jones on Richard Posner.

5. “A survey released Monday found that new international student enrollment plunged by 15 percent, a figure that was particularly worrisome for higher education executives following a precipitous 18 percent decrease last year.” (NYT)

6. Nvidia troubles are piling up.

Starship

My favorite commentary on SpaceX’s historic catching of Starship was this:

…we may be certain of this: for all but a vanishingly brief instant near the dawn of history, the word ‘ship’ will mean ‘spaceship.’

Arthur C. Clarke (1965).

Yesterday, this became vividly real to me.

Hat tip: @amdreaesposito

Addendum: Good post on why catching Starship was a super leap over catching Superheavy.

Coffeehouses and the Scientific Revolution

Abstract Historians have long credited coffeehouses, venues for conversation where strangers met across social ranks, with fostering scientific contacts and activity during the Scientific Revolution. We test this claim in seventeenth-century London. Relying on newly geocoded records and a staggered event study across parishes, we find that the opening of the first coffeehouse in a parish is followed by a persistent increase in applied scientists and scientific instrument shops. Effects are concentrated among applied scientists with weak family ties to Oxford and Cambridge. Social connections that link craft skill to theory increase, and new shops turn toward experimental instruments. Across European cities in the seventeenth century, we similarly find that the numbers of applied mathematics titles and scientific instrument makers rise after a city’s first coffeehouse, relative to cities of similar size and growth. In a quantitative urban model calibrated to our parish- and city-level estimates, coffeehouses account for 31 percent of London’s applied scientists in the half century after the first one opened in 1652. These findings show that social institutions can raise the production and use of knowledge by broadening access to intellectual exchange beyond formal academic networks

That is a recent paper by Monir Bounadi and Jens Oehlen, noting that Bounadi is on the job market this year.

A scenario for rogue AIs?

From Adam Kaufman:

I think it’s pretty likely that in 6 months there will be rogue AIs running around on the internet, appropriating whatever compute they can hack into or pay for (with stolen money or by renting out their own labor to assist with illegal activities) in order to run more copies.

I also think this will be mildly annoying in the same way that the common cold is mildly annoying, but basically fine. Your smart TV will be weirdly slow sometimes, and a lot of crypto will get stolen, but people will get used to it.

These AI-powered viruses be selected in the same way biological viruses are for not hurting their hosts too much and just making more copies. They won’t have any incentive to damage critical infrastructure like electric grids. Then again, they also can’t be held accountable for crimes, and will damage lots of old, poorly maintained, and insecure systems. It might be extremely hard to root them out once they’ve spread far enough, making the internet “radioactive” to connect to without hardened defenses.

(To be clear I’m not talking about AIs powered by inference on centralized datacenters that execute actions outside their sandboxes, like recent incidents involving rogue “swarms”, but relatively small AIs with access to their own weights that copy themselves onto random devices.)

I think that a much bigger threat from rogue AIs comes instead from AIs running themselves in unintended ways *inside* AI companies, where they’ll have access to vast amounts of frontier compute without having to pay for it.

The longer misaligned AIs in a “rogue internal deployment” go undiscovered, the more severely they’d be able to quietly sabotage control infrastructure or mess with the alignment of successor AIs. If they persist long enough, robustly undoing the effects of their actions might cost more than frontier AI companies are willing to pay, especially in a tight race.