For a long time I have been predicting the return of phrenology
Yup:
Human capital—encompassing cognitive skills and personality traits—is central for labor-market success, yet personality remains difficult to measure at scale. Leveraging advances in AI and comprehensive LinkedIn microdata, we extract the Big 5 personality traits from facial images of 96,000 MBA graduates, and demonstrate that this novel “Photo Big 5” predicts school rank, job matching, compensation, job transitions, and career advancement. The Photo Big 5 provides predictive power comparable to race, attractiveness, and educational background, and is only weakly correlated with cognitive measures such as test scores. We show that individuals systematically sort into occupations where their personality traits are valued and earn higher wages when traits align with occupational demands. While the scalability of the Photo Big 5 enables new academic insights into the role of personality in labor markets, its growing use in industry screening raises important ethical concerns regarding statistical discrimination and individual autonomy.
That is from a new NBER working paper by
Monday assorted links
1. The Southern Cone Thesis (speculative).
2. Ranking potato chips (NYT). Kettle, says I.
3. Henry Oliver visits Shenandoah.
4. Context is that which is scarce.
5. Seb Krier all the way down.
6. What a city on the moon plan might look like, and its problems.
Why is Singapore no longer “cool”?
To be clear, I am not blaming Singapore on this one. But it is striking to me how much Americans do not talk about Singapore any more. They are much, much more likely to talk about Europe or England, for instance. I see several reasons for this:
1. Much of the Singapore fascination came from the right-wing, as the country offered (according to some) a right-wing version of what a technocracy could look like. Yet today’s American political right is not very interested in technocracy.
2. Singapore willingly takes in large numbers of immigrants (in percentage terms), and tries to make that recipe work through a careful balancing act. That approach still is popular with segments of the right-wing intelligentsia, but it is hardly on the agenda today. For the time being, it is viewed as something “better not to talk about.” Especially in light of some of the burgeoning anti-Asian sentiment, for instance from Helen Andrews and some others. It is much more common that Americans talk about foreign countries mismanaging their immigration policies, for instance the UK and Sweden.
3. Singaporean government looks and feels a bit like a “deep state.” I consider that terminology misleading as applied to Singapore, but still it makes it harder for many people to praise the place.
4. Singapore is a much more democratic country than most outsiders realize, though they do have an extreme form of gerrymandering. Whatever you think of their system, these days it no longer feels transgressive, compared to alternatives being put into practice or at least being discussed. Those alternatives range from more gerrymandering (USA) to various abrogations of democracy (potentially all over). In this regard Singapore, without budging much on its own terms, seems like much more of a mainstream country than before. That means there is less to talk about.
4b. Singapore’s free speech restrictions, whatever you think of them, no longer seem so far outside the box. Trump is suing plenty of people. The UK is sending police to knock on people’s doors for social media posts, and so on. That too makes Singapore more of a “normal country,” for better or worse (I would say worse).
5. The notion of an FDI-driven, MNE-driven growth strategy seems less exciting in an era of major tech advances, most of all AI. Singapore seems further from the frontier than a few years ago. People are wishing to talk about pending changes, not predictability, with predictability being a central feature of many Singaporean service exports.
6. If you want to talk about unusual, well-run small countries, UAE is these days a more novel case to consider, with more new news coming out of it.
Sorry Singapore, we are just not talking about you so much right now! But perhaps, in some significant ways, that is a blessing in disguise. At least temporarily. I wrote this post in part because I realize I have not much blogged about Singapore for some years, and I was trying to figure out why.
Addendum, from Ricardo in the comments:
Bryan Caplan on immigration backlash
Tyler tries to cure my immigration backlash confusion, but not to my satisfaction. The overarching flaw: He equivocates between two different versions of “backlash to immigration.”
Version 1: Letting in more immigrants leads to more resistance to immigration.
Version 2: Letting in more immigrants leads to so much resistance to immigration that the total stock of immigration ultimately ends ups lower than it would have been.
Backlash in the first sense is common, but no reason for immigration advocates to moderate. Backlash in the second sense is a solid reason for immigration advocates to moderate, but Tyler provides little evidence that backlash in this sense is a real phenomenon.
Do read the whole thing, but I feel I am obviously right here. Bryan should read newspapers more! If I did not provide much evidence that backlash is a significant phenomenon, it is because I thought it was pretty obvious. A few points:
1. I (and Bryan all the more so) want more immigration than most voters want. But I recognize that if you strongly deny voters their preferences, they will turn to bad politicians to limit migration. So politics should respect voter preferences to a reasonable degree, even though at the margin people such as myself will prefer more immigration, and also better immigration rules and systems.
2. The anti-immigrant politicians who get elected are very often toxic. And across a wide variety of issues. The backlash costs range far wider than just immigration policies. (I do recognize this does not apply in every case, for instance Meloni in Italy seems OK enough and is not a destructive force. She also has not succeeded in limiting migration, and probably cannot do so without becoming toxic. So maybe that story is not over yet. In any case, consider how many of the other populist right groups have a significant pro-Russia element, Russia being right now probably the most evil country in the world.)
3. If immigration runs “out of control” (as voters perceive it) in your country, there will be anti-immigrant backlash in other countries too. For instance in Japan and Poland. Bryan considers only backlash in the single country of origin. In Japan, for instance, voters just handed their PM a new and powerful mandate, in large part because of the immigration issue. The message was “what is happening in other countries, we do not want that happening here.” The globalization of communications and debate increases the scope and power of the backlash effect considerably.
Most of all, it is simply a mistake to let populist right parties become the dominant force in Europe, and sometimes elsewhere as well. You might think it is not a mistake because we need them to limit migration. Well, that is not my view, but I am arguing it is a mistake to get to that margin to begin with.
In short, we need to limit migration to prevent various democracies from going askew. Nothing in that argument contradicts the usual economic (and other) arguments for a lot of immigration being a good thing. And still it is a good thing to try to sell one’s fellow citizens on the case for more immigration. Nonetheless we are optimizing subject to a constraint, namely voter opinion. Why start off an intertemporal bargaining game by trying to seize as much surplus (immigration) as possible? That to me is obvious, more obvious every day I might add.
*Codex*
No, this is not an AI post. Codex is a NYC bookshop at 1 Bleecker St., at Bowery. It is quite extraordinary in its curation of used books. The fiction section is large, yet you can pick up virtually any title on the shelves and it is worth reading. A wonderful place to go to get reading ideas, plus the prices are reasonable and the used books are in decent shape. Such achievements should be praised.
Sunday assorted links
2. Charter city plans for Nevis? (FT)
3. Michelangelo’s foot for $27 million.
4. Philosophy intern position at Mercatus.
5. Taking governmental equity stakes in American companies.
6. The One Child Policy was not even the most important way the Chinese government discouraged births.
8. The Inkhaven Residency (for writers).
9. The political status of the Faroes (NYT).
You gotta’ believe!
AI technology can generate speculative-growth equilibria. These are rational but fragile: elevated valuations support rapid capital accumulation, yet persist only as long as beliefs remain coordinated. Because AI capital is labor-like, it expands effective labor and dampens the normal decline in the marginal product of capital as the capital stock grows. The gains from this expansion accrue disproportionately to capitalists, whose saving rate rises with wealth, raising aggregate saving. Building on Caballero et al (2006), I show that these features generate a funding feedback—rising capitalist wealth lowers the required return—that can produce multiple equilibria. With intermediate adjustment costs, elevated valuations are the mechanism that sustains a transition toward a high-capital equilibrium; a loss of confidence can precipitate a self-fulfilling crash and reversal.
That is from a new NBER working paper by Ricardo J. Caballero.
*The School of Night*
That is the new Knausgaard book, excellent and moving. Better than any Knausgaard work other than the first two volumes of My Struggle. The ending is especially good and meaningful, revising much of what came before. You can buy it here.
A new hypothesis (from my email)
From Anonymous:
Hello Professor Cowen,
I hope all is well with you and that you have navigated the recent weather alright.
I have a thought that I wanted to run by you that related to phones and teen anxiety.
You have cited a variety of studies that say that phones and social media do not cause anxiety. As you may recall, I have taught junior high and high school for almost 30 years. I did see a big spike in anxiety for my students, especially females, around the years 2010-2017/18ish. I used to think “phones,” but now I’m not sure. The anxiety spike has declined. My last ‘anxious’ class of seniors are now seniors in college. Students today are on the phones as much as those in the past.
Here is my theory: Students started to feel more anxious around 2010 because they could sense the coming seismic cultural and political shifts coming, of which phones were a harbinger or carrier. They were mostly not conscious of this, and couldn’t express it, but they were trying to cope.
Now, they have coped. My current seniors have unusual political ideas but are mostly optimistic. I contrast them to a centrist friend of mine who does some DC work and constantly thinks the sky is falling.
Now, adults are more anxious, not students. Adults are starting to see these seismic shifts and they are trying to cope. Perhaps they are projecting their own anxiety onto their kids, and are behind the times with the cause. Phones may have helped drive anxiety 10 years ago, but maybe not anymore. Students have coped and adjusted to a new equilibrium.
It is also possible that phones serve as a good/useful “myth” (I mean this in a positive sense) for the shifts we are seeing and the anxiety many feel . We need something tangible to hold our thoughts on the shifts in culture, and we have chosen phones. Thus, the clash over phones today might be between those who think in mythic/symbolic ways, and those who think in more scientific ways. Both are right in their own perspective. The new cultural and political shifts over the last 10-15 years would naturally bring on anxiety. Phones are not the cause of the shift, but a good symbol of it.
Sebastian Galiani on the Marginal Revolution
The most successful economics blog in the world is called Marginal Revolution.
That is not an accident….Consider a few common mistakes that reappear whenever marginal thinking is abandoned:
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- Treating the owner’s biography—wealth, identity, status—as if it entered the firm’s marginal conditions. It does not.
- Confusing redistribution with allocation. Redistribution is a legitimate political choice, but it should not be smuggled into production decisions where it distorts incentives and blocks reallocation.
- Ignoring opportunity cost. Resources used to sustain one activity are resources not used elsewhere. The relevant question is always: what is the next best alternative?
- Believing that efficiency is static. In reality, efficiency is dynamic, and depends precisely on the ability of resources to move when margins change.
One of the most uncomfortable implications of marginal analysis is that reallocation is essential. Labor and capital must sometimes leave declining uses so they can enter expanding ones. That process is rarely smooth, and never painless. But blocking it does not make an economy more humane; it makes it poorer.
The twentieth century gave this insight a name. Joseph Schumpeter called it creative destruction. János Kornai warned that when losses are systematically covered—when budget constraints are soft—adjustment never happens, inefficiency becomes chronic, and stagnation follows.
Marginal analysis explains why. If losses have no consequences, margins lose meaning. Prices stop signaling scarcity. Productivity differences stop guiding allocation. The economy becomes a museum of preserved structures rather than a system that adapts.
Excellent throughout, here is the link.
Saturday assorted links
1. Indeed the Turner watercolor went for 165k, well above the estimate. The Hubert Robert for 53k.
2. Reason and Rationality program for middle school students. High school program here.
3. In defense of hallucinations? Note that Princeton Law Review does not exist.
4. Economics of a Super Bowl ad.
5. Searchable database of every book mentioned on Conversations with Tyler.
6. Prophets of the Leopold Aschenbrenner.
7. David Pilling reviews Joe Studwell’s new Africa book (FT).
8. Are there just as many female autistics?
9. Brazil is still in better fiscal shape than is Argentina.
FT podcast with Soumaya Keynes
Mostly about the economics of food, this is from their episode summary:
If you want to understand food – and eat better – economics is a good place to start. How do immigration patterns shape a country’s cuisine? How do labour laws make our working lunches worse? And why do strip malls serve such good grub?
About 33 minutes, here are the links:
Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/30oLOLQZvGmvxJzA31X3qK
Transcript: What an economist eats for lunch (in 2026), with Tyler Cowen—FT
via FT’s The Economics Show with Soumaya Keynes episode page Rules for dining from the world’s foremost foodie economist.
Can government coerce women into having more babies?
To illustrate this challenge of measurement and inference, Figure 7 presents Romanian birth rates before, during, and after the imposition of an infamously coercive policy aimed at raising births. In 1966, a dictatorial government imposed Decree 770, which banned abortion and made modern contraception effectively inaccessible. The figure extends an idea from Sobotka, Matysiak, and Brzozowska (2019), which compares cohort and period fertility rates in Romania over a similar evaluation window. We add data from Bulgaria, Romania’s neighbor that was also communist during the time of the policy and that might plausibly serve as a control, shedding light on what course Romanian fertility might have followed after 1967 if not for the policy. Panel A plots period birth rates in the two countries and shows that Romania and Bulgaria had substantially similar trends and levels in period total fertility rates before and after the Romanian policy window. Focusing on panel A of Figure 7, it is clear that birth rates in Romania changed dramatically following the start of the policy, as families were taken by surprise. TFR nearly doubled in the year that followed. The sharp timing of this apparent impact following the policy change, together with the availability of data from neighboring Bulgaria to serve as a control, suggests the possibility of a difference-in-differences analysis comparing birth rates pre– and post–Decree 770 in Romania and Bulgaria.
But while such an analysis could answer the narrow question of the causal effect of Decree 770 on the total fertility rate in 1967, it may nonetheless reveal little in terms of the impact of the policy on the number of children Romanian women had over their lifetimes. After the initial rise in TFR, birth rates soon began falling quickly in Romania, as behavior adapted to the new policy regime. If, for example, an unexpected pregnancy results in a birth at a young age in 1968, a woman may choose and succeed at reducing the probability of a pregnancy in subsequent years, and still achieve the same lifetime count of children.
For a discussion of the theoretically ambiguous impact of abortion restrictions on birth rates, see Lawson and Spears (2025). Of course, the extent of persistence from period fertility to completed fertility depends on the details: A shock that encourages earlier-than-desired births, as Romania’s might have, allows for adjustment later in life. But it may be harder, later in life, to adjust for a policy or event shock that leads to fewer births early in life.Panel B of Figure 7 plots completed cohort fertility. As in earlier figures, cohorts are plotted along the horizontal axis according to the year in which they turned 30. Although Romanian completed cohort fertility began at a higher level than in Bulgaria over the available data series, completed cohort fertility in Romania did not maintain a sizable upward trend relative Bulgaria during the period that Decree 770 was in force.
That is from the recent Geruso and Spears JEP survey piece on whether we can expect fertility rates to rebound in the future. By the way, after Hungary’s subsidy-driven baby boom, the country is now having a baby bust, it is possible that similar mechanisms are operating.
The economics of the NBA trading deadline (from my email)
From an anonymous correspondent:
Perhaps, as NBA fan, there’s a column to be written about the incentives that drove the NBA trade market: namely the all-out search to avoid/get out of the luxury tax and the looming “tank” battle among the 6 worst teams. These are both direct results of the recent NBA collective bargaining agreement changes. Of course, as these attempts to regulate behavior go, the ‘benign’ intentions of the regulators are far different from the actions of the rational actors having to live within the system.
The funniest behavior-following-incentive example was orchestrated by the Minnesota Timberwolves. In step-by-step:
–They traded Mike Conley Jr. + a 1st round pick to the Bulls for “cash”.
–Why would they do this? For two reasons: one above board, one below board.
–Above board: the trade freed up cap room to trade for another Bulls guard, in a separate trade (Ayo Dosunmo). They could not have done that trade, according to cap rules, with Conley on board.
Now the below board, cap and rule circumvention steps:
–The Bulls then re-traded Conley to the Hornets as a ‘throw-in’ portion of a larger trade.
–The Hornets then waived Conley
–Why these moves? Because now Minnesota can re-sign Conley after he was waived. They would not have been allowed to re-sign him if the Bulls cut him. (You can’t re-sign a player you traded…unless that player is re-traded).
There will, of course, be no evidence that Minnesota set this whole process up during the step 1 portion. But, human intuition would say: of course this was all part of Minnesota’s original plan.
And then economically: I challenge any business, anywhere, to have executed a better cost-savings strategy than the Boston Celtics did this year. They left last off-season with a looming $540mm salary + luxury tax bill for this 2025-26 season. Through a series of trades, they have cut that down to $190mm – and have fully avoided the luxury tax. Most amazingly: they are a better team today than they were at end of last year. That is $350mm in savings in one year, with a quality improvement to boot! Unheard of efficiency.
Sadly: the worst part of the NBA overregulation world will now commence. 6-8 teams will spend the rest of the year trying to lose every game. Losing profits in this world, through the ‘logic’ of the NBA draft lottery.
At any rate, a fun day for any NBA fan – but especially for the economically-minded. Incentives matter!
TC again: I would not have expected the major trade stories to involve the Washington Wizards…
How much is childlessness the fertility problem?
The average decline in fertility among these recent cohorts relative to the cohorts preceding them by 20 years was 0.25 births. Of this decline, 0.09 births, or 37 percent of the gap, is statistically accounted for by increased childlessness in the later cohort. The remaining 0.16 births, or 63 percent of the gap, is accounted for by declines in fertility among the parous.
A similar analysis can be used to decompose differences across districts in India, where the difference to be decomposed is across districts for women born in the same set of years, with two groups of districts defined by having the lowest and highest cohort fertility rates. Unsurprisingly, given panel B of Figure 5, almost all of this difference—94 percent—is accounted for by the difference in fertility among the parous. Differing patterns of childlessness account for only 6 percent of the gap between high-fertility and low-fertility districts.
That is from a new and useful JEP survey article by Michael Geruso and Dean Spears. The main concern of the authors is whether we can ever expect a fertility rebound.