*Reputation and Power*, a new theory of the FDA
The subtitle is Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical Regulation at the FDA and the author is Daniel Carpenter. Here is the book's home page but I don't yet see an Amazon listing. Here is a Barnes&Noble listing, note the price discount.
Where to start? It exhausts me to even write about this book, which is the most comprehensive and most detailed study of a regulatory agency written — ever – to the best of my knowledge. It supplements and overturns all existing work on its subject and it will prove a model for future investigations. It's not short!
The starting point is the notion of reputational capital and the claim that the FDA seeks to preserve and extend its reputation, for a variety of political reasons. One implication of this is that the FDA is sometimes too loose and other times too strict but that both biases are possible. The framework is then used to address numerous questions, including the following:
1. Why the U.S. has the most bureaucratically intensive drug regulation in the world.
2. Why the 1962 amendments were passed.
3. Why FDA regulation is so often treated as de facto irreversible.
4. Why the tenure of a division director matters for how the decisions of that division are treated.
5. Why there is so much judicial deference to the FDA.
6. Why the FDA has been so influential on a global scale.
7. How public attention affects the speed of FDA procedures.
The author makes a strong case that the FDA is one of the most powerful and most important regulatory agencies in the world and one of the most important extensions of state power. Everyone interested in the economics of regulation should read this book, just be prepared to be a little overwhelmed. I would also note that this is not mainly a partisan book in one direction or the other, though on net I read the author as wishing to see a stronger FDA. (On p.379, for instance, I read Carpenter as overly dismissive of the "drug lag" argument.)
Here is Carpenter's previous book, which I have not read. For the pointer to this work I thank Steve Teles.