« The countercyclical asset, a continuing series | Main | More niggling on fiscal stimulus »
Was bailing out Long-Term Capital Management a good idea?
Here is my latest NYT column. It starts as follows:
The financial crisis is a result of many bad decisions, but one of them hasn’t received enough attention: the 1998 bailout of the Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund. If regulators had been less concerned with protecting the fund’s creditors, our current problems might not be quite so bad.
Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, and Lehman Brothers were all major creditors of LTCM. Given that regulation is inevitably imperfect, and cannot foresee or prevent every firestorm in advance, this was one chance to send a very stern message to those creditors. Perhaps no LTCM bailout would have meant dire consequences at the time, but still:
...Fed inaction might have had graver economic consequences, especially if a Buffett deal had fallen through. In that case, a rapid financial deleveraging would have followed, and the economy would have probably plunged into recession. That sounds bad, but it might have been better to have experienced a milder version of a downturn in 1998 than the more severe version of 10 years later. In 1998, there was no collapsed housing bubble, the government’s budget was in surplus rather than deficit, bank leverage was much lower, and derivatives markets were smaller and less far-reaching.
I've been reading much about LTCM in recent times, and in so many ways it was a micro- dress rehearsal for our later problems. This column also criticizes the current now-standard practice of "regulation by deal."
Addendum: Matt Yglesias adds: " At the time I think everyone was clear on the idea that if institutions such as LTCM were “too big to fail” that they had to be brought into a regulatory umbrella. But as soon as it was clear that disaster had been averted, a lot of people became complacent about operationalizing this determination to expand the scope of regulation and some of the key participants — especially Alan Greenspan — in the bailout only redoubled their opposition to regulation."
Posted by Tyler Cowen on December 27, 2008 at 10:14 AM in Economics | Permalink
Comments
Thanks to all for the comments. Very informative! Barkley notes that LTCM was not the origin of "too big fail". So maybe it is wrong to point to the LTCM "bailout" as the seed of moral hazard which blossomed oh so horribly 10 years later. But even then in my mind, and (I think) Greg's too, while LTCM may not have been a seed, it should have still been a reminder to everyone that moral hazard was out there.
Streetwalker seems to say that most hedgers and IBers don't really think in these terms, but just tend to put their head down and go for it. Makes sense to me, but that doesn't mean moral hazard isn't a problem, and it doesn't mean that (some of the) moral hazard does not stem from implicit Fed guarantees. To use Streetwalker's hypo, a dog is still a dog, even if it doesn't know it.
Posted by: Curt Fischer at Dec 28, 2008 2:12:49 PM
[Did typepad eat my earlier attempt at posting this? If not, sorry for reposting -- CF.]
Thanks to all for the comments. Very informative! Barkley notes that LTCM was not the origin of "too big fail". So maybe it is wrong to point to the LTCM "bailout" as the seed of moral hazard which blossomed oh so horribly 10 years later. But even then in my mind, and (I think) Greg's too, while LTCM may not have been a seed, it should have still been a reminder to everyone that moral hazard was out there.
Streetwalker seems to say that most hedgers and IBers don't really think in these terms, but just tend to put their head down and go for it. Makes sense to me, but that doesn't mean moral hazard isn't a problem, and it doesn't mean that (some of the) moral hazard does not stem from implicit Fed guarantees. To use Streetwalker's hypo, a dog is still a dog, even if it doesn't know it.
Posted by: Curt Fischer at Dec 28, 2008 3:03:15 PM
[Did typepad eat my earlier attempt at posting this? If not, sorry for reposting -- CF.]
Thanks to all for the comments. Very informative! Barkley notes that LTCM was not the origin of "too big fail". So maybe it is wrong to point to the LTCM "bailout" as the seed of moral hazard which blossomed oh so horribly 10 years later. But even then in my mind, and (I think) Greg's too, while LTCM may not have been a seed, it should have still been a reminder to everyone that moral hazard was out there.
Streetwalker seems to say that most hedgers and IBers don't really think in these terms, but just tend to put their head down and go for it. Makes sense to me, but that doesn't mean moral hazard isn't a problem, and it doesn't mean that (some of the) moral hazard does not stem from implicit Fed guarantees. To use Streetwalker's hypo, a dog is still a dog, even if it doesn't know it.
Posted by: Curt Fischer at Dec 28, 2008 3:03:29 PM
Yglesias nails it better. Bailing LTCM was the right thing to do at the time. The essential follow-up would have been to insert regulatory measures to prevent future LTCMs from happening. But the follow up never occurred. THAT was the crucial mistake, not the bailout itself.
Posted by: Jason at Dec 28, 2008 9:35:40 PM
Just had a brainwave. These too-big-to-fail entities are tricky, especially when you need to triage when they fail all at once. Instead of rewarding stupidity, you could instill a Crown (public) "shadow company" with a skeleton operating staff every time one of these companies exists. When they fail, activate the shadow company to fill in the breach and temporarily take over their core functions. If necessarily hire some of the failed company's workforce as temporary consultants. There are many ways to privatize such a newly created Crown. This way instead of draining taxpayer coffers, the shadow company becomes a revenue source when you sell it.
Hiring a shadow workforce is expensive but not nearly as much as are bailouts.
Posted by: Phillip Huggan at Dec 29, 2008 2:50:01 AM
Brainwave. Whatta dork. To elaborate, a shadow company wouldn't solve the main problem that presented itself recently where you have investment banks that are insolvent because of too much bad debt.
It does solve a tiny little bit of the conflict of interest issues that arise as bad debt is being accumulated. Most employees could still get rich ripping off a bank's investors and quitting. But some might wish to keep their jobs longterm and would've be afraid of getting fired and replaced with shadow-employees.
More importantly, when massive sums of money are being handed out as bailouts, a shadow-bank would have mangement different and presumably less likely to make the same mistakes over again. These bailout sums are more than the market caps of the banks. When the financial sector is managed this badly, why not boot out those who can't responsibly handle the power of leverage?
Posted by: Phillip Huggan at Dec 29, 2008 10:13:17 AM
For what it's worth, I'm with Tyler on this one. In response to an earlier post at EconLog, I wrote the following:
As I understand it, when the Fed intervened in the case of Long Term Capital Management, it did so to prevent "systemic collapse." That was only 10 years ago. Now we have far greater government interventions to prevent the same thing. Is there some sort of regulation that can protect the financial system per se without stifling creativity? If the question sounds naive, I'm sorry, but I'm not an economist.
I don't recall anyone talking about a serious threat to the overall financial system in the 1970s or 1980s. Then came the 1990s. I seem to recall some fear of spillover from the Mexican crisis, and then from the Asian crisis; then came LTCM, and now we have the current situation. The new financial tools and the freeing of global capital seem to be overburdening the entire system. How do we protect THAT?
Posted by: English Professor at Dec 29, 2008 12:05:28 PM
I think Chris, Barkley, and StreetWalker are focusing on the wrong party guilty of moral hazard. StreetWalker correctly points out that Fuld was desperately trying to find a merger partner rather than sitting around and waiting for a Fed rescue, it is also true that a bailout is super-humiliating.
However, I have strong feeling that Lehmans creditors expected some sort of a bail out from the Feds. The creditors are the ones that were poisoned by the LTCM response, this was most clearly seen by the AIG fall out. The credit default swaps were purchased blindly with the same faith one buys auto or life insurance. The faith that if the insurer does not pay up, someone, anybody, or Uncle Sam if neccessary, shall make good on the agreement.
Posted by: Martin at Dec 29, 2008 5:40:43 PM
I think you folks are missing the reason LTCM was a watershed. Prior to the 1987 stock market crash, no one ever dreamed that any institution but a commercial bank with lots of deposits could be considered too big to fail (TBTF). In 1987 a precedent was set that the Fed would intervene if the markets and investment banks were in trouble -- step one in the revolution. The idea that the Fed considered a hedge fund TBTF made it clear that there would be government intervention as soon as financial markets hit a rough spot.
The issue with LTCM is the extension of TBTF doctrine beyond commercial banks to include markets and a wide variety of financial institutions.
Posted by: ccm at Jan 2, 2009 12:20:04 PM
Mabinogi online gold
Mabinogi money
Mabinogi Gold
cheap Mabinogi gold
buy Mabinogi gold
2moons dil
2moons gold
buy 2moons dil
2moon dil
cheap 2moons dil
Flyff gold
flyff Penya
flyff money
buy flyff penya
cheap flyff penya
cheap flyff gold
aion gold
buy aion gold
cheap aion money
aion money
cheap aion gold
Dofus kamas
buy dofus kamas
cheap kamas
dofus kama
dofus gold
dofus money
Knight Online Gold
Knight Gold
Knight Noah
Knight Online Noah
Posted by: aion at Jul 8, 2009 9:04:47 PM