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The Coldest Winter
When word of the North Korean invasion reached Washington, it was late Saturday evening and the American government, which did not then operate eighteen hours a day seven days a week, was scattered. The president, a man with a great fondness for train travel, had dedicated a new airport...on Saturday and then flown home to Independence, Missouri. Dean Acheson, the secretary of state, was on his farm in Maryland and the other key figures in the government were doing the most banal of weekend things.
...The moment Truman heard about the invasion, he began to prepare for his return to Washington. Still, he was careful not to vary his schedule. That Sunday morning he visited his brother Vivian's farm as originally planned.
That is from the immediately gripping The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War, by the late David Halberstam. It's yet another splendid fall book, though I am still wondering why government leaders did not work harder back then.
Posted by Tyler Cowen on September 28, 2007 at 06:39 AM in History | Permalink
Comments
hmm..
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/02/AR2005080201703.html
"The August getaway is Bush's 49th trip to his cherished ranch since taking office and Tuesday was the 319th day that Bush has spent, entirely or partially, in Crawford -- roughly 20 percent of his presidency to date, according to Mark Knoller, a CBS Radio reporter known for keeping better records of the president's travel than the White House itself. Weekends and holidays at Camp David or at his parents' compound in Kennebunkport, Maine, bump up the proportion of Bush's time away from Washington even further."
Posted by: josh at Sep 28, 2007 8:21:23 AM
"[G]overnment leaders did not work harder back then" because either
(a) there was less work for them to do, or
(b) the ridiculous workaholic obscession had not reached government yet,
or both.
Posted by: FERGUS O'ROURKE at Sep 28, 2007 9:43:05 AM
It wasn't that they didn't work hard, long hours; They worked at a very different pace for two reasons-- a sense of propinquity that we no longer have, and with communication systems that seem almost languid today.
Word reached Truman through his Air Force communications officer, assigned through the Pentagon. The officer traveled with the president but often stayed overnight in nearby hotels or military bases-- connected only by phone call or car travel. This was built on top of a system of teletype machines which were the fastest communication devices used by the government, which still had a big manual plug-in switchboard at the White House and a massive set of switchboards at the Pentagon.
Truman was a WWI officer and businessman/local politician from an rural state. That style of personal, look-you-in-the-face, interaction was the norm in D.C. and throughout most of the country. His generation moved at a deliberate pace (and that word has real power to describe the style). They were born into a world of telegraphs, horses, and one telephone per town. The next group of US leaders were far more technically aware, had experience with WW2 technologies, and came of age with radio and faster, shorter educational, social, and everyday interaction.
Posted by: The other Eric at Sep 28, 2007 9:52:49 AM
With the exception of Reagan, I suppose that Truman and Eisenhower were your last two successful Presidents.
Posted by: dearieme at Sep 28, 2007 10:05:27 AM
they didn't work harder because they were either competent or had less work interfering in our lives.
Posted by: David Zetland at Sep 28, 2007 10:27:44 AM
I am still wondering why government leaders did not work harder back then.
They weren't as rabid about picking our pockets?
Posted by: RJ at Sep 28, 2007 10:53:50 AM
RJ's tax explanation induces a chuckle, but doesn't fit the facts. The federal government's share of GDP has been hovering around 20% since 1945.
Posted by: David Wright at Sep 28, 2007 11:36:55 AM
We weren't nearly as involved with the world back then. Events now are on a 24/7 schedule, as the world is a much smaller place and events happen much more quickly.
Luckily, as Josh has pointed out, technology allow the Pres to conduct business from anywhere in the world.
Posted by: Tom at Sep 28, 2007 12:24:42 PM
according to this : http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=3521&type=0&sequence=0 , in 1950 spending was only 15.6 % of gdp. in 2000 - 18.4 % .
Posted by: azer at Sep 28, 2007 1:01:06 PM
I'm wondering why Truman's brother's name was Vivian.
Posted by: John Payne at Sep 28, 2007 1:09:09 PM
As the son of a Korean War vet (who is mentioned in ths book), I've read quite a few histories of the Korean War. I am particularly impressed by Halberstam's last work. A lot of military history can be mechanical and plodding, but Halberstam is a great writer and a great storyteller. This may be the most accessible book on the Korean War. However, MacArthur worshippers will not be pleased.
Posted by: Mace at Sep 28, 2007 1:50:56 PM
Tyler,
Isn't the more meaningful question; Why do we rich future people work harder than those poor past people?
Posted by: RobbL at Sep 28, 2007 3:06:00 PM
They had a lot more in the way of competent delegation. There were people who could hold the fort while they did other things.
Posted by: TW at Sep 28, 2007 5:20:54 PM
Azer: Picking low and high points in a noisy series masks the basic trend. If you look at this graph, I think you'll agree with my characterization of the basic trend: the federal government's share of GDP has more-or-less been on a high plateau for the entire post-war period.
Posted by: David Wright at Sep 28, 2007 5:27:00 PM
There's not a huge difference vs today in that quote. Our Presidents still take vacations, especially during the muggy DC summers. Our cabinet secretaries still mostly take weekends off except during crunch times (which apparently this wasn't).
Halberstam might be wrong about the work schedule, too. Surely, those who conducted military and Coast Guard patrols had a different perspective. The biggest difference is that the govt didn't have a high-ranking command structure to deal with 24-hour crises forced on us by nuclear and terrorist considerations.
Before you decide that the past was more deliberate, or the present more workaholic, you may want to consider that people worked longer hours. In Truman's day, because most Americans, including Truman's family, were farmers, and farmers have always had ridiculously long hours to get by. History books are full of night marches and sailings, even among the supposedly languid South in the Civil War. The most hyperactive President we've ever had, TR, was in office a century ago.
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Posted by: 无缝钢管 at Nov 13, 2007 9:05:37 PM
For a book which was supposedly meticulously researched, there is an enormous amount of blatant errors.
First I was a member of the 1st Cav from spring 1947 thru mid-November 1949. First as an assistant BAR man, 2d Platoon, Baker Troop, 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry Regiment. Later, assigned to 2d Brigade Intelligence under Capt Jefferson Clay III and Brigade Commander Hugh French Thomason Hoffman (who had at one time been the Division Commander. After the reorganization from a square to a triangular division in March 1949, I was on detached service Tokyo Area Military Headquarters commanded by Brigadier General Hoffman. In about June, I reverted back to duty at Hq & Hq Company, 8th Cavalry Regiment.
p.1-Halderstam refers to Sergeant First Class Bill Richardson. The Army has never had such a rank. The Air Force does now, but did not in 1950.
p.10 - He quotes a 1st Cav soldier talking about marching down the Ginza wearing their yellow cavalry scarves and passing the Dai-Ichi Building.
Firstly, the only members of the 1st Cav who wore yellow scarves were the Military Police-they also had yellow leggings. Secondly the Dai-Ichi Building is about 2 miles from the Ginza. During my 2 and a half years in the Cav, we NEVER marched on the Ginza. We always used the large parade grounds adjacent to Emperor Hirohito's Palace.
p.11 - He mentions that the men were questioning whether to bring parade clothes or winter clothing with them. The only clothing they brought to Korea were fatigues and possibly "long johns". Everything else was left back in the barracks in Japan. You don't take non-essentials into combat and even more so when you are making an amphibious landing as the 1st Cav did.
Also, the comment about MacArthur offering to send an entire division from Korea is a total fabrication. He was extremely upset about the decision by Washington to withdraw combat troops from South Korea in 1949. In fact, he issued a statement that if they were withdrawn, the North Koreans would be crossing the 38th parallel within a year. In fact, it was only about 11 months. He was even more upset shortly after that when Washington decided to withdraw the 11th Airborne Division from Sendai in Northern Japan as that left only three understrength divisions in Japan.
p.3 & 12 -He mentions weak and ill-prepared American and South Korean forces. He is absolutely correct about the ROK's. One of his arguments in 1949 against withdrawing of combat troops from S. Korea was that the ROK's did not have the equipment or training to even slow down a North Korean attack. American forces were weak because we got very few replacement troops, and all the new equipment was being funneled to Europe. As for being ill-trained, in the summer of 1949 all men with a year or more left in their enlistments were to be transferred to the 24th Infantry Division in Southern Japan, closest to Korea. We transferred about 1,000 men from the 8th Regiment alone. In about July, all units were to undergo war maneuvers. For the 1st Cav, we started out with mountain maneuvers on Mt Fuji for six months. Upon completion of that, six months of amphibious training was scheduled. All of our gear except fatigues and combat gear was left in footlockers in our barracks. I cannot speak for what happened in the 14th and 15th Divisions, but I know the first Cav was fully committed. I don't know where all units were except Division Artillery and that is because our area was adjacent to theirs.
p.16/17 -He mentions "Pappy" Miller, assistant Platoon Sergeant. As of late 1949, we had NO assistant platoon leaders. That would have been an impossible luxury. My platoon at that time was commanded by a Staff Sergeant. The only two officers in the company were the Company Commander, a 1st Lt. and the Platoon Leader for the heavy weapons platoon, who was a 2d Lt. He mentioned Sgt Miller being in the 7th Infantry Regiment in mid July, attached to the 1st Cav. The 7th Infantry Regiment, along with other elements of the 3rd Infantry Division didn't arrive from Fort Devens Mass. until November.
On pages 17/18, he mentions ammo dropped loose in boxes. The only so-called "loose" ammo was that destined for use in BAR's. It was packed in steel cans, I believe about 600 rounds per can. Garand ammo was packed in similar cans, but in bandoleers of ten 8-round clips per bandoleer and I think 10 bandoleers per can.
More Later after I read more.
Posted by: Ed Parmenter at Dec 13, 2007 1:24:28 PM
In my comment above, is mistakenly said 14th and 15th Divisions. I should have said 24th and 25th Divisions.
Posted by: Ed Parmenter at Dec 16, 2007 2:58:04 PM
Page 18-Halberstam refers to a Corporal Lester Urban, a 17 year old Corporal weighing only 100 pounds. First of all, when I first tried to enlist in 1946, I only weighed 120 pounds and had to go back home and get my weight up to 124 pounds.
Secondly, I enlisted at 17, but had to get my parents to sign. Thirdly, a l7 year old Corporal? I don't think so, not even under those conditions. I was almost 18 before I got my first stripe, and about 18 1/2 when I made Corporal and about 19 when I got my third stripe. If I hadn't been in Brigade Intelligence, I am sure I would not have gotten those promotions that quickly. Privates and PFC's were runner types, NOT Corporals! A Corporal would have been a Squad Leader!
Page 21 - He mentions a Sergeant Bill Richardson being on his 3rd extension since the end of WW II and being at Ft. Devens, Mass. He could not have been on an extension in 1950 because beginning at least by 1948 you either took a discharge or re-enlisted for 3 or 4 years. He also could not have been a charter member of the 3rd Battalion of the 8th Cavalry Regiment in 1950 as the third Battalion was activated in Japan in March or April 1949. If he was at Ft. Devens in June/July
he would have been in one of the units of the Third Infantry Division which arrived in Korea in November 1950.
Page 22 - He mentions a Colonel Edison as being commander of the l8th Cavalry Regiment. Not True! Colonel "Killer" Kane was the commander from 1950 thru 1951.
Page 12 - He mentions a Major General "Hap" Gay as being Commander of the First Cavalry Division. The Commander during that time was Major General Hobart Gray, who took command of the First Cav from Major General William "Wild Bill" Chase.
Hap Gay is close, but if he had actually done a little research, he would have gotten it right. It only takes a couple of minutes to get on the First Cav Website to see all the commanders of the Division.
Page 53/54 - Halberstam refers to the suspicions against MacArthur's intelligence staff because "They didn't think ground troops were necessary in South Korea" Halberstam is a very good story teller but he surely strays a long way from the truth. In fact, General MacArthur was very public about complaining the removal of combat troops from South Korea in 1949. The 8th Cavalry Regiment made massive transfers of troops to the 24th Division in the early summer of 1949, and as I have said before, the entire First Cavalry went on war maneuvers in about June or July 1949. The word we got, was that we would remain on maneuvers, first mountain maneuvers for six months and then amphibious maneuvers for the next six months, and aif the North Koreans had not started anything by then, we would start all over with more mountain maneuvers.
Page 56 - He mentions the "casual attitude" of MacArthur's staff about the attack on June 25th. May I remind you that President took SIX days to make up his mind(The N. Koreans attacked on June 25th Far East Time, which was June 24th, Washington time. He didn't make a decision until June 30th, which was July 1st, Far East Time. The first group from the 24th Division (Task Forth Smith)consisting of approximately 400 men, not the 540 reported by Halberstam) were airlifted to Korea on July 2d, the day after the President authorized the use of ground forces in Korea. That would have required at least two trips each by about 16 C-47's. That would have required that at least one, but probably two Combat Cargo Squadrons to fly down from Yakota near Tokyo in order to support that airlift. They would have had to be in place at Itazuke in Southern Japan by July 1st. It is also a matter of record that the balance of the 24th Division and all of the 25th Divisions had advance elements landing at the Port of Pusan on July 5th, with the last units going ashore on July 18th. That is moving about 20,000 troops and all their combat gear onto ships, making the trip from southern Japan and unloading at Pusan. In addition, their landing wasn't an easy one, as Typhoon Helene was striking the Korean Peninsula at the same time, in fact that Typhoon prevented about half of the First Cavalry from making their amphibious landing at Pohandog on July 18th, and they had a longer distance to travel than the troops from Southern Japan as they left from the Port of Yokohama. To put this in perspective, the 24th Division troops on ships would have taken about 20 hours to make the trip under ideal conditions NO including loading time. The 25th Division troops would have taken about 40 hours plus loading time. That means that they would have had to begin boarding troopships the SAME day that the President authorized using ground troops in Korea!! The First Cav trip from Yokohama would have taken almost 4 days because they had to travel about 800 miles. Considering that normally there were no more than two troopships at the port of Yokohama at any given time, General MacArthur, prior to June 1950, would have had to prevent troopships from returning the the U.S. for at least several months prior in order to provide sufficient transports. The First Cav would not need a lot of troop transports as most of the men had been undergoing amphibious training for the previous five months, but some ships would have been required for transport of Armor and Heavy Artillery.
Page 59-Halberstam mentions that MacArthur allowed bombers on Wake Island to sit on the ground for 9 hours after Pearl Harbor was attacked. FIRST-MacArthur was not in control of Wake Island in 1941 - He was the miltary Governor of the Phillipines ONLY! SECOND-there were never any bombers on Wake Island, there were only 12 Marine Corps F43F Grumman fighters and 3 PBY Catalina flying boats used for reconnaisance and anti-submarine patrols. THIRD-The Japanese attack on Wake came within several hours and eight of the fighters were destroyed in the initial attack as were all 3 of the Catalina's. Halderstam also says, supposedly quoting some British historian, that MacArthur should have stayed with his troops and either died with them or be taken prisoner. Aside from the fact that he had been ordered to leave the Philippines and go to Australia, what military commander would be so stupid as to stay when the result would only be death or capture? FOURTH - The responsibility for the debacle in the Philippines AND at Pearl Harbor rests on the Political and Military Leaders in this country who were duped by the Japanese into believing that they would not go to war with the U.S.
Page 60/61.- General MacArthur had absolutely no control over the strength of the military units in Japan. Up through June 1950, the bulk of replacement troops went to units in Europe, as did all of the newer equipment. According to the Pentagon, "budget constraints" forced the removal in 1949 of combat troops from South Korea and of the 11th Airborne Division stationed at Sendai in Northern Japan. That left only three understrength divisions in the Far East instead of 4 and a half.
Page 83 - As for no one talking about the poor condition of the South Korean Army, in the summer of 1949, General MacArthur made the point of stressing the fact that the South Koreans did not have the training or equipment to repel an attack by North Korea. However, the Pentagon and Congress ignored his comments because they did not want to increase military spending, particularly in Asia at a time when most of them thought the biggest Communist threat was in Europe. Also page 83, the report by General Roberts about the condition of ROK forces was concurred in by General MacArthur and was used as his justification for requesting that combat troops NOT be removed from South Korea!
Page 102 thru about 137 - Halderstam must have hated MacArthur for some reason, otherwise why the diatribe on those 35 pages? He was not alone in that, for I knew a large number of men in the First Cav who had been under MacArthur from 1943 through 1949. To a man, they thought he was an egotistical SOB, BUT, TO A MAN, THEY SAID THAT THEY WOULD HAVE OBEYED ANY ORDER HE GAVE THEM, BECAUSE THEY RESPECTED HIM AS A MILITARY TACTICIAN!! That group included about a dozen or so non-coms and three officers ranging from a 1st Lt. through a Brigadier General.
Page 104 - FIRST, The Dai Ichi Building was NOT the heart of a Japanese Insurance Empire. There was NO insurance business in Japan prior to the end of World War II, let alone an insurance empire! There was not evlen a concept of any kind of insurance until after the war was over!!
Page 116/117 and pages 138/139/140- American troops entering combat were NOT ill-trained. As I have said before every unit underwent about eleven months of combat training prior to going to Korea. The only untrained or partially trained troops would have been those who came in late 1949 or early 1950. We were starting to get SOME draftees in late 1949. None of then had the full infantry basic training. At that point, in late 1949, none of them had more than about nine months of their year left to serve. I refer you to my earlier comments about training and transit time from Japan to Korea when it comes to his comments about training.
Page 140 - I don't know why Halberstam keeps acting like all the troops were pulled from cushy duties in Tokyo. He talks about "many of them poor boys back home who now lived with servants and had undergone only the most minimal training"
As a matter of fact, the only military personnel I know who had servants were officers who had their families with them in Japan. As far as how poorly the ROK's did would have been absolutely NO surprise, at least to any member of the First Cavalry Division. We had been briefed as early as early 1949 about how poorly trained and equipped they were. The first amphibious landing planned for Korea was had been planned for Inchon by the First Cavalry Division, but because the North Koreans had major forces south of the Han river, the landing place was changed to Pohang-dong on the eastern side of the Korean peninsula. Because of Typhoon Helene, only the 8th and 5th regiments made it ashore on July 18th before the typhoon hit. The 7th regiment and Division Artillery did not land until July 22nd after the typhoon subsided. Inchon was on the western side and much further north and only about 20 miles west of Seoul. The landing there was rescheduled.
Page 141 - Halberstam states that "The 24th Division got the last pick of everything coming, and it was acknowledged by consensus to bge the weakest." By whose consensus - Halberstam?. As I have said previously, in the summer of 1949, approximately 1000 men were transferred from the 8th Cavalry Regiment to the 24th Division. That included most of the men in the 8th who had at least a year left to serve. The only ones retained who had a year or more to go were non-coms who were needed to form a cadre of experienced men to train newcomers to the regiment.
Page 142 - Second paragraph - FIRST - Halberstam is always talking about duty in Tokyo. The First Cavalry Division had responsibility for the area from about 150 miles South of Tokyo where elements of the 25th Division were responsible, to about 150 miles North of Tokyo where elements of the 11th Airborne were responsible. After the 11th Airborne was withdrawn in mid 1949, the First Cavalry was responsible for the entire area for about 400 miles to the northern tip of Honshu plus the small northernmost island OF Hokkaido. Of the four regiments in the First Cavalry Division, only one battalion of the 8th Regiment, the First, was actually stationed in Tokyo. SECOND-mid-paragraph, He states "in a devastated, impoverished, burned-out Japan" Total falsehood-when I arrived in early 1947, there was little evidence of a devastated, burned-out Japan. I traveled from North of Tokyo South as far as Osaka and there was little evidence of any devastation. The largest burned out area I saw while there was after an earthquake, when many homes, with their thatched roofs, burned to the ground. Those were all rebuilt within weeks! As far as not showing up for roll call on Monday morning, when I was in the First Battalion, we had roll call at 6 AM every morning, including weekends and it wasn't run by the company clerk-he read the names, but the company commander was always there EVERY morning, so there was no hanky-panky!
Page 143 - Halberstam quotes a Col. John Michaelis, supposedly the first Regimental Commander in Korea, as saying "When they started out, they couldn't shoot, they didn't know their weapons. They had not had enough training in old-fashioned musketry. and so on. During my time in the Cav, I had learned to be able to field-strip and reassemble, not only my Garand, but the BAR and the 30 Cal. bipod equipped air-cooled machine gun in the dark! That included replacing a firing pin and the barrel of the 30 Cal. MG. I also spent time in MARKSMANSHIP (NOT MUSKETRY) TRAINING. I fired the Garand at ranges from 200 to 1,000 yards.
I fired the BAR from the prone position and I also learned to fire the 30 Cal. MG in bursts of 3 rounds. No mean feat when you consider that holding the trigger for a full second would send off 5-6 rounds! Also, during the entire 30 months in Japan, I never had a lecture about Communism and Americanism. We were NEVER told to buy War Bonds, nor were we told to write home or to give to the Red Cross. We also were not road bound, as the only vehicles we had were the jeeps and weapons carriers used by the Heavy Weapons Company, in my case "D" Company, First Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment! On our marches, we only used roads to bypass farmlands until we got to maneuver areas where there were NO roads! I don't know why Halberstam thinks we were so well supplied with vehicles? Our Official name was First Cavalry Division (Infantry)! That is what we were - foot soldiers who didn't need roads, in fact we were told to avoid roads whenever possible. The only reason we used them in Japan was to avoid ruining crops of farmers who lived between our base and the maneuver areas on Mt. Fuji.
Page 150 - again, the First Cavalry Division Commander was Major General Hobart Gray NOT "Hap" Gay!! During my assignment in the 2d Brigade, over about 2 years, we only had 4 Courts Martials-the first was a Tech Sergeant who was busted to Private with no stockade time, for fraternizing with a Japanese woman. The 2d was a PFC busted to private with 30 days in the stockade for assaulting a Japanese Policeman while drunk and breaking the policeman's arm. The third & 4th were two privates who went AWOL and ended up murdering a Japanese policeman in a village in Chiba Prefecture. The were sentenced to life imprisonment at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Page 145 - He mentions men of the 34th Infantry Regiment in Tokyo. They were never in Tokyo, which is on the main Japanese island of Honshu. The 24th Division, of which the 34th was a part was stationed on the southern island of Kyushu, over 600 air miles south of Tokyo. He also mentions that men of the 34th were told to pack their summer dress uniforms-TOTAL LIE! Everything except combat gear was to be left in footlockers in their barracks- why pack something just in order to bring it back!! Again, how could thy get back to the good life in Tokyo? They had never been there, except for the ones transferred from the 8th Cavalry Regiment, part of which was stationed in Tokyo, with the rest based in the small town of Omiya, about an hour East of Tokyo by train.
Page 146 - he mentions that Task Force Smith took about 540 men. Actually there were only about 400 men. On page 147 he states that the men of Task Force Smith retreated, unable to destroy any of the 25 North Korean tanks. He also states that they could not communicate with the artillery. In fact, the 155 MM howitzers did manage to destroy five of the 33 T43 tanks before they were overrun and had to retreat, leaving the howitzers behind. He also states that men took off their boots so that they could run faster through the rice paddies. From my experiences in Japan, wearing boots in a rice paddy doesn't slow you down a bit. In fact you would lose precious time unbuckling and unlacing them so you could take them off.
Page 154, last two sentences-What units in Tokyo was General Walker commanding? The only combat unit in Tokyo was the 2d Battalion of the 8th Cavalry Regiment. A Lt. General would normally be in charge of something like the 8th Army, or possibly a Corps Commander.
Page 156 - Halberstam mentions that whenever a troopship docked in Yokohama, all the best officers were skimmed off by MacArthur's headquarters. After the landing at Pusan, no troopships stopped at Yokohama before going to Pusan. All ships went directly thru the straits between Honshu and Kyushu, almost 600 miles south of Yokohama. Since the average speed of a troopship was about 10 knots, going to Yokohama first would have delayed any troop arrivals in Korea by at least 3 days, a luxury the army could not afford.
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