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Farewell to Alms, pp.112-192
Through a series of fascinating discussions, Clark constructs building blocks for his larger argument. I count several major strands in this section:
1. There is a discussion of "survival of the richest"
2. A discussion of why technical advance was so slow before 1800
3. A discussion of how much institutions matter, and asking why medieval England didn't grow more rapidly.
4. "The emergence of modern man"
These arguments are a bit hard to evaluate, since Clark has not finished presenting them or tied them all together. I regard each section as pathbreaking, but in terms of reservations, I will present two notes of caution...
1. Exactly which national groups evolved a sufficient love of capitalist ways of life? Clark's statistics show that the wealthy had more surviving kids in England, relative to the poor. Furthermore some numbers suggest that the same was less true in accident-prone primitive societies, where selection is based more on luck and physical force.
Even putting aside the debate on how long evolution requires (who will be the first to mention lactose intolerance and dachsunds in the comments?), does this explain the economic supremacy of England? Recall that England climbed out of the Malthusian trap but most of the rest of Europe did not. Was positive selection more pronounced in England than in Italy? Than in France? There is no evidence for those propositions, which in any case strike me as unlikely. Even if one buys into positive selection, we have at most "positive selection for some countries vs. others," not "positive selection elevating England over the rest of Europe and driving an industrial revolution." Positive selection doesn't get us very far in explaining the climb out of the Malthusian trap, which was more or less unique to England and the Netherlands.
Clark mentions in passing that positive selection bred the Chinese to be natural capitalists. If we accept this portrait, I am now more confused about a) where positive selection operated and where it did not, and b) what was the marginal product of positive selection, vis-a-vis industrialization? Until the 1980s or so, the Chinese record simply isn't very good over the last few centuries.
In fairness to Clark we have not yet finished his discussion of these factors.
I'll also note that I see positive selection in terms of culture, family norms, and peer effects, rather than genes. Or you might think it is some mix of the two. If you focus on the biological issues in the comments I think you're missing the strongest and most general version of the argument.
2. I am not persuaded by Clark's argument that "institutions do not matter." True, medieval England had limited government intervention but it did not industrialize or "take off." Clark's discussion is right on, and if the English example does not persuade you try medieval Iceland, which was probably even freer.
But my conclusion differs from Clark's. I conclude "science is more important for growth than we had thought, and the simple fact of freedom does not itself guarantee much progress for science." In this view the institutions which support science matter profoundly. Science, science, science. I recommend Jack Goldstone's forthcoming book, much of which focuses on science and engineering culture in early modern England.
Infrastructure also matters. In medieval England the state wasn't strong enough to help establish a large open geographic area for trading. Early English economies were still local rather than national, and yes economies of scale matter.
That all said, I will accept a reformulated argument: "Institutions matter, but we should not take institutions as exogenous." On this middle ground just about all of Clark's substantive contributions will hold up. So I view him as overstating his case, and taking too big a swing at institutional theories. This overreaching, however, does not negate his core arguments. So maybe you disagree with Clark on this point, as I do, but you cannot use it as reason to dismiss his other claims.
By the way, here is Ricardo Hausman on the book. Here was installment one of this BookForum.
In closing, we can now see that Clark's core arguments don't depend on Malthusianism; they require only that economic growth is something very difficult to accomplish, and indeed that is the case.
Posted by Tyler Cowen on August 28, 2007 at 06:07 AM in Books | Permalink
Comments
Survival of the Richest and the Industrial Revolution
Some of Tyler's legitimate questions about how this would operate are addressed in chapters 12 and 13. The key idea of the book is that:
(1) All agrarian pre-industrial societies were subject to the same pressures making their cultures more "middle class"
(2) This process advanced more rapidly in England than in Japan or China because of accidents of demography and history (ch. 13)
(3) The Industrial Revolution was more diffuse than is generally thought - it was less abrupt and less English than is generally thought.
(4) Had England not existed some society would have had an Industrial Revolution within a few hundred years of the actual Industrial Revolution.
Posted by: Gregory Clark at Aug 28, 2007 8:11:06 AM
Gregory Clark and Adam Smith (posted this morning in wrong thread, sorry)
I think we must distinguish sharply between the Adam Smith from Kirkcaldy who wrote Wealth Of Nations and the ‘Adam Smith’ from Chicago who didn’t and ‘his followers’, that is those taught in American campuses in the 20th century who never read his books for themselves, but who believed versions of his alleged ideas in the form of popular quotations selected by their tutors (many if not most of whom hadn’t read Adam Smith’s books either).
Gregory Clark narrowly evades being lumped completely with the latter, but he is in the ante-chamber of accepting Chicago’ neoclassical version of Adam Smith care of George Stigler and Co. (See pages 145-6 of Farewell to Arms).
Smith did not say that ‘people everywhere are the same’ (a ludicrous statement – they are not even the same in the same family!). He said, as did Hume, that human nature is the same within the range of possible varieties and has been throughout the ages. Readings of Herodotus, Machiavelli, the Bible, Shakespeare, et al, show human characters that modern readers can relate to. Smith discusses some of this in his Lectures in Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1762-3) published by Liberty Press. In so far as ‘material preferences and aspirations’ means anything, Smith said that the motive of ‘seeking to better themselves’ was endemic. This was not just narrowly about ‘material preferences’; it is in many things (natural elements causing humans to seek shelter, etc.,) where modern sets of ‘material preferences’ did not exist.
It wasn’t than growth was guaranteed given ‘given the right incentives’ as if the latter was a pre-condition for the growth. Smith explicitly rejected that notion in his criticism of the Francois Quesnay who believed ‘perfect liberty’ was a pre-condition for opulence. Smith asserted: ‘ If a nation could not prosper without the enjoyment of perfect liberty and perfect justice, there is not in the world a nation which could ever have prospered’ (WN IV.ix.28: p 674).
Hence, Greg’s statement, which melds with his, perhaps justified criticism of the World Bank and IMF economists (trained in, and practitioners of, neoclassical economics and also unread in Smith too), on pages 145-6, needs revision.
I am not clear where Smith in Wealth Of Nations ‘repeatedly explains’ poor performance in the pre-industrial world as a deficiency in ‘incentives’. If it does permeate the WB and IMF and econ depts, they did not get that from Smith.
His critique of mercantile political economy was that its foreign trade and colonial policies distorted the British economy (made it under perform in growth terms) because it provided the wrong (not ‘poor’) incentives (Book IV and chapter IX of Book V).
Being reasonably familiar with Smith’s historical approach I am not sure where his ‘vision’ has been unconfirmed by empiricists. Greg has a narrow vision of Smith’s account of the revival of European commercial societies following the 1,000 year interregnum after the fall of Rome in the 5th century to the 15th century. His Lectures On Jurisprudence and Wealth Of Nations clearly show his attention to elements of this revival in nascent trade from small settlements and towns, mainly near waterways and coasts, and the country-town trade in agricultural and manufacturing products, and in the transformation of serfdom into tenancy farming. If ‘serious empirical studies’ contradict Smith’s actual analysis I shall need a great deal more convincing from Greg.
Commercial societies did not begin in 1800 (an arbitrary boundary). They had a long history, linked to foreign trade and improving technology (think of the chronometer in long distance navigation proven in Captain Cook’s voyages; bookkeeping in Venice, and so on).
Smith was the long-run specialist par excellence. His so-called ‘followers’ in US academe are epigones in this regard.
Posted by: Gavin Kennedy at Aug 28, 2007 8:35:40 AM
On Adam Smith and modern economists
I accept Gavin Kennedy's comment that it was wrong to attribute to Smith the simplified version of his views that modern economists typically associate with Smith. I was just looking for a convenient shorthand for a set of views. "The Smithian vision" has in some sense become detached from Smith himself.
But on the substance I DO want to claim that Smith and others have a false picture of the past. Economic scholarship about, in particular, medieval England has advanced enormously in the past 50 years, and gives us a very different picture of early societies than was possible in earlier years. Smith could not have understood that there had been NO institutional improvement between 1200 and 1800.
In particular markets were much more developed than Tyler supposes in his critique. Grain markets by 1200-99, for example, seem to have been integrated nationally (see my web page, "Markets and Economic Growth? The Grain Market in Medieval England (2001)).
Posted by: Gregory Clark at Aug 28, 2007 9:30:43 AM
Tyler,
I am pretty shocked at the amount of reading you are able to cram into a day...how long does it take you to read 80 pages and pull out the detailed notes that you do...?
CS
Posted by: CS at Aug 28, 2007 9:43:16 AM
I have a few more questions for Greg since I don't feel that he has addressed one of the point Tyler made. This is why did the break from Malthusianism occur in England rather than elsewhere in Europe? You have provided some evidence why this was less likely to occur in China or Japan. A traditional argument put crudely is that England after 1688 had better 'incentives' for growth but you dismiss this. This means that your theory has to provide its own set of arguments for why England and not France, Italy, or the Netherlands
As far as I am aware many of the patterns you detect in England such as lower interest rates were European-wide phenomenon. Does your theory indictate why England was special or do you have make recourse to the conventional arguments about the nature of the state, institutions etc. for that part of your argument?
Posted by: Mark Koyama at Aug 28, 2007 9:47:15 AM
What I guess I want is evidence that the selection pressures were more intensive in England than elsewhere in Europe (quite a tall order I know). And I also would want is more theory or evidence linking these selections pressures to actual phenomenon. Again I realise this is a very difficult thing to do.
I also think other factors must be driving some of the movements in the interest rate you show since the fall in the first half of the fourteenth century is quite steep - too steep to represent a change in preferences I would imagine.
Posted by: Mark.Koyama at Aug 28, 2007 9:52:31 AM
Why England?
The book tries to point out that the IR in England was part of a wider European development, and English experience then was not as sharply different as people believe. It argues that there were systematic trends in the way societies were developing, but there were also important idiosyncratic differences in social energy that have persisted to the current day.
The book does firmly reject the idea that English institutions played any role in all this.
Posted by: Gregory Clark at Aug 28, 2007 10:08:12 AM
Science, science, science!
Tyler stakes his faith in the institutions that promoted science in England, influenced in part by his colleague (and my former colleague) Jack Goldstone.
Some problems with this:
(1) The innovations that launched the Industrial Revolution had nothing to do with science, and were not made by people of any formal scientific training. The economic rewards for such innovations were no better than in the middle ages, or in the Roman Empire.
(2) Such an explanation then just pushes the problem of the IR back a step. Why did better institutions to reward science only appear in the seventeenth century?
Posted by: Gregory Clark at Aug 28, 2007 10:13:52 AM
Survival of the richest
To me, this is one of Clark's most startling and important ideas. His evidence seems quite convincing. Can anyone offer a critique or counter-argument?
I appreciate Clark's spirited defense of his book, always coming back to his central points.
I am also surprised at how much I am enjoying this read -- it's truly a pleasure.
Posted by: Kent Guida at Aug 28, 2007 10:33:19 AM
Smith could not have understood that there had been NO institutional improvement between 1200 and 1800.
Especially given that he died in 1790, and the Wealth of Nations was published in 1776, which of course are dates before 1800. It's not surprising that Adam Smith could not predict events that happened after his death.
I am puzzled though - are you claiming that at the time Adam Smith wrote that there had been no institutional improvement since 1200 in Britain? I find it hard to believe. For example, levels of violence dropped off, as you can see in the new houses built with much less fortifications than before, the dynastic stability, the union between Scotland and England (and Wales) with the ending of the border wars?
And Adam Smith himself, while without a statistics department, records many examples of improvements in living standards, such as the expansion of shoe-wearing through Scotland. Has research proven his work there wrong?
I thought I kept up reasonably well with this economic development literature for England - it's surprising to hear that there were no institutional improvements for 600 years.
Posted by: Tracy W at Aug 28, 2007 11:03:32 AM
To me, this is one of Clark's most startling and important ideas. His evidence seems quite convincing. Can anyone offer a critique or counter-argument?
Sure. Clark shows that the rich reproduce more successfully than the poor.
But what exactly logically follows from that?
Posted by: Barbar at Aug 28, 2007 11:06:00 AM
"What exactly follows from that" is more or less the subject of the rest of the book, which I have not yet finished reading, but which I look forward to.
With all due respect, some comments, especially Tyler's, involve a lot of jumping ahead -- raising questions which are dealt with in later chapters. This is a little bit tangential. How solid is the argument of each of the 4 chapters for this week?
Posted by: Kent Guida at Aug 28, 2007 11:32:02 AM
"Clark shows that the rich reproduce more successfully than the poor.
But what exactly logically follows from that?"
I show also that the sons of rich fathers tended to also be rich. Further the success of the sons was not just a function of their having inherited wealth. They inherited, either by learning or by genetics, economic abilities from their fathers.
I show also that going back to 1250 the children of the rich were taking over the whole of the positions in the society.
Thus the possibility exists that by biological means the culture, and even perhaps the genetics, of English society was changing.
Further characteristics we associate with economic success - patience, abstention from violence, education, hard work - were all changing at the society level.
A lot, potentially, follows from this. It is just a possibility, but an intriguing one.
Posted by: Gregory Clark at Aug 28, 2007 12:10:42 PM
"it's surprising to hear that there were no institutional improvements for 600 years"
Surprising, but true! Comparing 1200 to 1800 we so see a decline in violence. But by 1800 tax rates were much higher, significant inflation had appeared for the first time, there was a huge government debt, and trade was restricted by large scale war with the French, and men in port cities were being kidnapped into the navy. Is that a better setting for economic activity?
Medieval housing may have had smaller windows to deter intruders (though more likely from the high cost of glass), but by 1800 the government's window tax was allegedly causing people to brick up windows to avoid the intrusion of the government revenue demands.
Posted by: Gregory Clark at Aug 28, 2007 12:19:50 PM
The science of Clark and Sailer is truly dismal science but it is good for us to try and consider it fairly.
Does anyone think that protestant Christianity played a supporting role in progress in England?
Posted by: Floccina at Aug 28, 2007 2:10:22 PM
Why does the very idea of behavioral or cultural changes that take place over centuries arouse such hostility? Especially when Clark merely mentions the possibility that there may be a genetic component? I am truly at a loss to explain that reaction, which is in the background here but very common in the discussion on the Ricardo Hausman blog Tyler links to. I understand the reluctance of economists to question the common institutionalist point of view, but the hostility to cultural evolution seems to be something more.
And shouldn't there be a law against yelling "Spencer!" in a crowded seminar?
Finally, I don't understand Tyler's last comment, about Clark's core arguments not depending on Malthusianism.
Posted by: Kent Guida at Aug 28, 2007 2:46:44 PM
I have two comments:
1. Although I find persuasive much of what Professor Clark writes, I do note a tendency at times for him to assume the Malthusian trap rather than establish that there is a trap. The most striking example I found of this in today's pages is his short paragraph just before the middle of p. 124. After having laid out that the birth rates are higher and the death rates are lower for higher income families, he writes:
"Thus there is no sign that even preindustrial England in the period 1600-1800 had escaped the grip of the Malthusian trap. The curves displayed in figure 6.3 imply that any significant increase in average incomes would have led immediately to rapid population growth."
This second sentence is surely wrong. Those curves on their own don't imply that at all. Rather, if one assumes that the Malthusian model is correct, one will reach Clark's conclusion.
2. On p. 152, Professor Clark undercuts his own case on marginal tax rates. He points out, correctly, that the effect of high marginal tax rates on hours worked, as distinct from the effect on hours reported, may well reflect the size of the underground, "off the books" economy. But this has, for the last 25 or so years, been one of the main arguments we "supply-siders" have made. Because the work is off the books, so also the income will be off the books, thus making for lower reported income.
Posted by: David R. Henderson at Aug 28, 2007 3:45:58 PM
Children of the wealthy tend to be wealthy, even after controlling for direct wealth transfers. The book argues that this is due to transfers of traits from parent to child. An obvious competing argument is that it is due, instead, to transfers of social connections or status from parent to child. It seems as though a central thesis of the book depends on support for the former explanation over the latter. Is there evidence supporting one explanation over the other?
Posted by: Ryan at Aug 28, 2007 4:37:04 PM
Even putting aside the debate on how long evolution requires (who will be the first to mention lactose intolerance and dachsunds in the comments?)...
I should point out this isn't really subject to much "debate". It is unnecessary to pick out selected examples from artificial selection or the pop science canon (though as many examples could be selected as you want), since the logic and math of population genetics are conceptually simple and deductively true. Falconer pretty much is the final word.
All you need to know is the parameters: if there is genetic variation for a given trait (as assessed by heritability) and if there is a selection pressure on this trait (as assessed by the rate of differential reproduction/survival across generations), then it is a by definition certainty that you have biological evolution. The extent of that evolution is just a little math. Genetic anthropologist Henry Harpending has already discussed this in the context of Clark's book:
It shouldn't be hard to ballpark this stuff. The wealth differential has been found everywhere anyone has looked in pre-demographic transition groups. What he describes in England is the same as what happened in Portugal or Sweden.For a ballpark, assume time preference has an additive heritability of 25%. Assume that everone with time preference more that 1 sd above the mean of the distribution has double the fitness of everyone else. About 16% of the population then has twice the number of offspring as everyone else on average.
After a generation of reproduction the new mean time preference will be increased by (0.2 * .25) or 5% of a standard deviation. In 20 generations, 500 years, time preference should go up by a full standard deviation.
The best talking sociologist I have ever read is Edward Banfield. He thought that time preference was at the core of class differences. Time preference does also have a very high IQ correlation. (Clark's token arm waving about IQ in his manuscript does him no credit).
Henry
All the traits Clark reviews - violence, literacy, time preference, etc. - are heritable to some degree, so it is a virtual certainty (not just a vague 'possibility') that the differential reproduction Clark documents was biologically altering English society during the time period he explores.
I would like to say, in slight disagreement with Dr. Harpending, that I found Dr. Clark's short argument for greater selection pressures on forager over agrarian intelligence (pp 187-188) a thought-provoking piece of evidence in favor of Jared Diamond's (oddly politically correct) racial theory.
On the other hand, I too am disappointed that the available evidence on this issue was ignored. The measured intelligence for modern foragers is very low (save the Eskimos and subarctic Indian tribes, who actually are above the world average), and this includes their transculturally adopted children. Starting from that data, it is less convincing that settled societies did not have a unique selection pressure on this trait. It's possible that forager life skill-sets tapped into more domain-specific cognitive traits [*], while the novel abstract symbolic requirements of arithmetic and written language (and greater "Machiavellian" requirements of dealing with larger conglomerates of people) in settled societies created pressures on more domain general cognitive traits.
[*] For instance Aboriginal Australian and Eskimo populations (adopted, assimilated, and not) do far exceed Europeans and East Asians on certain cognitive test items, such as visual memory.
Posted by: Jason Malloy at Aug 28, 2007 4:54:55 PM
Also, I must disagree with Dr. Clark's focus on 'culture' over biological evolution. The evidence for 'culture' (vertical transmission of values and human capital traits from parent to child) from behavioral genetics is amazingly weak, while the evidence for genetics is very strong.
The evidence (simplified): the human capital traits of parents (IQ, Big Five, criminality) do not transmit to their adoptive nonbiological children at all, while these traits strongly transmit from biological parents to their adopted away children.
This fact alone makes Dr. Clark's book and theories even more politically incorrect than I think he realizes (or desires).
Posted by: Jason Malloy at Aug 28, 2007 5:10:52 PM
The types of evidence Mr. Malloy brings up in the previous comments are exactly what I find wanting in Clark's book. The presence and heritability of specific personal traits that make one economically successful, and a society more economically productive, is a testable hypothesis. It seems more central to Clark's main thesis than much of the economic data in the book. Of course, I haven't read much further ahead yet.
Posted by: Eric Preston at Aug 28, 2007 5:31:03 PM
Clark's summary on pp. 183-189 usefully links his theory to the vast socio-cultural literature on European "uniqueness" and the origins of modernity (Hegel, Weber, Simmel, etc.) In fact, his framework has a vaguely "Marxist" ring to it, in which "infrastructural" economic and demographic characteristics of preindustrial society create the framework in which specific "superstructural" developments like Protestant literacy and bourgeois values can provide the proximate preconditions for the Industrial Revolution, at the same time explaining why it happened first in England. Very useful work awaits a generation of historians in filling in the links between these levels of analysis.
Posted by: David H. Levey at Aug 28, 2007 6:05:47 PM
A couple of empirical questions. In a book about "A Brief Economic History of the World," there is almost no discussion of the Americas, no discussion of 1492, and none about the "American Holocaust" thesis. Yes Easter Island, Hawaii, and Arctic Canada are mentioned (p. 143).
Why?
Also, there seems to be no discussion of hydraulic society in Asia or oriental despotism.
Could the hydraulic engineering involved in large scale infrastructure projects in China have led to Chinese technological sophistication before 1400?
Posted by: Bill Stepp at Aug 28, 2007 6:22:05 PM
I agree with the criticisms that the genetic evolution timeframe is probably too short and that Clark has not sufficiently demonstrated that these selection pressures were unique to Western Europe generally much less England in particular. Even worse, his theory is contradicted by the fact that England went from being an industrial leader in the mid 19th century to an industrial also-ran by the middle of the 20th century. It was surpassed in productivity by Germany, Japan, much of Scandinavia, and the United States where by 1900 Anglo-Saxons were a minority, and today it is surpassed by many countries in Asia. Genetic evolution doesn't work nearly that fast. Any eugenic effect leading to English economic superiority in the 19th century would have largely persisted to this day.
A much better explanation comes from looking at the institutional revolutions unique to Western Europe that directly preceded the industrial revolution, and in particular book consciounsess. The rise of a free market in cheap books led to, among other things, a radical reduction in the costs of teaching skills and a radical increase in trust and economic coordination due to the rise of national languages. This led, in the first instance, to Western Europe's conquest of the world's oceanic trade routes and the onset of colonization and to a radical change in the way children and adults learned economic skills. The industrial revolution emerged out of the confluence of control of worldwide trade routes and markets with the radical decreases in the costs of organizational coordination and skill teaching. England in particular led because of its low costs of protecting itself from continental wars.
Posted by: nick at Aug 28, 2007 8:54:27 PM
We don't just have genetics versus teachings, status, and capital as factors influencing how parents can give children an advantage. There's another effect that I haven't seen mentioned here: biological non-genetic influences.
In particular, food is the biggest biological factor aside from genetics. Upper class kids of Medieval parents would have gotten more and better food. Therefore their immune systems would have been stronger and they wouldn't have suffered as much damage to brain and body due to diseases. Plus, the rich kids were better housed and clothed. Also, better nutrition would have enabled their brains to more fully develop as compared to poor kids. So even given identical genetic variations for IQ as poor people (and I'm not saying the rich and poor had the same distributions of alleles for IQ) the rich kids would have been smarter.
Today in industrialized countries the difference between potential and realized intelligence is much smaller than it was 500 years ago. So if a selective pressure works on intelligence today more of that selective pressure acts on alleles and less of social factors.
Having said all this, of course selective pressures have been acting on human populations over the last couple of thousand years. The evidence for this keeps piling up. See, for example, the Plos Biology paper A Map of Recent Positive Selection in the Human Genome.
Recent articles have proposed that genes involved in brain development and function may have been important targets of selection in recent human evolution [8,9]. While we do not find evidence for selection in the two genes reported in those studies (MCPH1 and ASPM), we do find signals in two other microcephaly genes, namely, CDK5RAP2 in Yoruba, and CENPJ in Europeans and East Asians [46]. Though there is not an overall enrichment for neurological genes in our gene ontology analysis, several other important brain genes also have signals of selection, including the primary inhibitory neurotransmitter GABRA4, an Alzheimer's susceptibility gene PSEN1, and SYT1 in Yoruba; the serotonin transporter SLC6A4 in Europeans and East Asians; and the dystrophin binding gene SNTG1 in all populations.Several other biological processes that have not previously been proposed as targets of selection also show an enrichment for signals of selection. For example, the category of electron transport genes is significant in Europeans, due in large part to selection in CYP genes. CYP genes are mainly expressed in the liver and catalyze many reactions involved in breaking down foreign compounds, including the majority of pharmaceutical agents. Genes in this class with evidence for selection include four genes in the CYP450 gene cluster on Chromosome 1p33, as well as CYP genes in other genomic locations including CYP3A5, CYP2E1, and CYP1A2. Another category showing enrichment of selection signals is phosphate metabolism in East Asians and Europeans. Genes in the phosphatidylinositol pathway seem to be particularly overrepresented among the significant genes in this category, including INPP5E, PI4K2B, IHPK1, IHPK2, IHPK3 in East Asians and IMPA2 and SYNJ1 in Europeans.
Note how all these selective pressures were causing the various human populations to genetically diverge.
Any alleles possessed in greater frequency by by wealthier people were selected for before the IR. I think it likely that greater reproductive fitness of the wealthy created selective pressure for IQ and probably for other traits as well.
Posted by: Randall Parker at Aug 28, 2007 9:51:13 PM
