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Nozick's experience machine
Robert Nozick, in Anarchy, State and Utopia, offers an interesting hypothetical; I don't have a copy of the book ready to hand so will give you my version:
Someone invents an experience machine; get into it and you will have a fully convincing illusion of experience. Somehow, the inventor figures out about what your life is going to be like and makes you the following offer:
Get into my experience machine, spend the rest of your life there, and I will give you the illusion of a life slightly better than the one you would otherwise live. Your average income in the illusion will be a few thousand dollars higher than it would have been in reality, your wife a little prettier, your children slightly better behaved, your promotions just a little prompter. Your illusory summers won't be quite as hot, or winters quite as cold.
As I (and Wikipedia) remember the thought experiment, your life [sic] is much better, a bit like the Hollywood movie of your choice, at the very least.
This thought question is supposed to refute utilitarianism, or at least its hedonistic version. Pleasure isn't everything, and authenticity counts too.
But for an economist, Friedman is oddly non-interested in the marginal questions. At what age should you opt for the experience machine? If it can give you eighty more years of subjectively perceived time on your deathbed, that is a no-brainer. At what per capita income level should you prefer the machine?
Or say you don't want the machine, but your acceptance will save five other people's lives. Would you proceed without guilt? And how many lives should be needed to push you over the edge?
Is the experience machine example so compelling as a refutation of hedonism? I think it puts pleasure squarely on the map as one value which matters and which is even undervalued in many circumstances. Many of us are too reluctant to step into the machine rather than too ready. Isn't our general tendency to overvalue the illusion of control?
Posted by Tyler Cowen on August 2, 2006 at 02:50 AM in Philosophy | Permalink
Comments
Tyler's last paragraph is rather odd.
On the one hand, he recognizes that the most people would have an aversion to using the experience machine. On the other hand, that aversion flies in the face of the logic of hedonistic utilitiarianism, and hedonistic utilitiarianism is such a powerful tool for economic theory that he doesn't want to give it up. So in a rather pathetic attempt to avoid the logic of Noziak's argument, tries to argue that people have the wrong preferences. They should be hedonistic utilitarians, even it they aren't. (Because, turning empericism on its head, then our theoretical apparatus would work better.)
Tyler, don't we endeavor to beat this kind of thinking out of our students in the first semester?
Posted by: David Wright at Aug 2, 2006 3:11:28 AM
Tyler's last paragraph makes perfect sense. After all, Nozick posed the question 'what would you choose (or prefer)?' Tyler's question is: if your preference is for avoiding the machine, does your preference make sense? The general point Tyler is making, if I have him right, is intriguing: can't we combine authenticity with pleasure? And if so, surely there can be different mixes. I wouldn't want the experience machine now; but it would look very good when I'm on my deathbed. Now, would I want to spend the rest of my money then on the machine or leave my children an inheritance? What would they want for me?
Posted by: Chandran at Aug 2, 2006 3:45:39 AM
Since Dr. Cowen is already inside the machine (it is called The Mind) it is the discussion about the existence of a choice that is the illusion.
Posted by: MTC at Aug 2, 2006 3:56:21 AM
My own memory of the passage is hazy as well but my copy of the book is not ready to hand...
Does the thought experiment actually refute utilitarianism? It depends on whether utilitarianism presupposes the claim that the only valuable thing in the world is a certain mental state, i.e., pleasure. I do take the thought experiment to refute that claim whether or not utilitarianism presupposes it.
Let's grant, for the sake of the argument, that the only valuable thing in the world, the only object of desire that is chosen for its own sake and never for the sake of something else is a certain sort of mental state, viz., a pleasurable one. But if that is so, it would be inconceivable that we would ever, under any circumstances, prefer not to go into the machine than to go in. In particular, it would be inconceivable that we could even think that we can be somehow better off staying out than in. But there are circumstances in which we do think that staying out is better than going in. Ergo, it can't be true that the only valuable thing in the world, the only object of desire that is chosen for its own sake and never for the sake of something else is a certain sort of mental state, viz., a pleasurable one.
But does economic theory actually presuppose the claim that the only valuable thing in the world, the only object of desire that is chosen for its own sake and never for the sake of something else, is a certain sort of mental state, viz., a pleasurable one? I am not sold on that.
Posted by: Huichieh Loy at Aug 2, 2006 4:17:24 AM
One version of the machine is called heroin.
Posted by: Huggy at Aug 2, 2006 7:10:33 AM
A better, more realistic thought experiment would be to ask -- if such a machine were available, how many hours a day would you use it?
But, of course, it's not really a thought experiment, since versions of the machine are in daily use by millions of people worldwide. They're known as video games. The 'family and relationship' version mentioned in the thought experiment is available in some form ('The Sims'), but mostly in the machine, people are more powerful -- with weapons, armies, and kingdoms at their disposal, they drive supercars around race-courses in the Alps, they play any sport like a pro with little or no practice, and so on. And it's social -- they interact with others in the machine who may be, in reality, located anywhere around the world.
The verisimilitude increases all the time, and people certainly don't seem to avoid these machines due to 'inauthenticity'. Doesn't seem like a rejection or refutation of hedenism to me...
Posted by: Slocum at Aug 2, 2006 7:22:13 AM
The original thought experiment is that the experience machine offers you the best possible set of experiences for your personal preferences. So if you need a little adversity to overcome, it gives you that. If you prefer to have to work to win your mate, then you experience the effort.
Nozick's point is not that we prefer other things over pleasure all the time. Rather, pleasure is just one of many values. Most people would prefer to have an average but real life to an experientially better but fake life. We prefer not just to have the experience of being witty or smart or morally good, but to actually be witty, smart, and morally good. We would prefer not just having the experience of friendship but to actually have friends. Nozick's thought experiment is broader than an attack on hedoism. It shows, if successful, that we value things other than experiential states. We have a plurality of values that experiental theories of value fail to do justice to. The experience machine doesn't refute, say, preference utilitarianism, because preference utilitarianism (crudely put) holds that the best state of affairs consists in the maximum satisfaction of all preferencess. The experience machine doesn't satisfy all preferences.
And, of course, as Nozick recognized, pleasure is a value. In some cases, like when one is about to be tossed in a gulag, the experience machine is a good deal. Most of us prefer our average but real lives to the experience machine life, but that doesn't mean we prefer real torture followed by real death to the experience machine.
That makes me think--Suppose one wanted to become a martyr for a cause. The experience machine could give you the experience of being persecuted, tortured, and killed, but you'd be mad to learn that it's fake and you haven't actually died for anything.
Posted by: J. at Aug 2, 2006 8:11:54 AM
Regarding Slocum's comment:
His version poses a better question for economists. It's not a better question overall, as he puts it. It serves a slightly different purpose from Nozick's, and it wouldn't have functioned as well in the context of Nozick's book.
Posted by: J. at Aug 2, 2006 8:17:46 AM
A good point to watch Vanilla Sky / Abre los Ojos, I think.
Posted by: Ross Parker at Aug 2, 2006 8:54:30 AM
Wouldn't the experience machine provide the illusion of control? The proposition "a fully convincing illusion of experience" implies that once you get in the machine, you no longer remember that you stepped into the machine (otherwise the illusion would not be fully convincing).
It can't be the illusion of control we value. It has to be the actual fact of control, or what we believe is the actual fact of control when we make the decision. It has to be that what we believe to be the truth of our own autonomy outweighs a convincing belief in our own autonomy in the future.
Posted by: Paul Gowder at Aug 2, 2006 9:26:19 AM
Another question you might ask is this. If you were in the machine and came to know it, would you want to leave it? Tyler's questions about the margin might apply here too. So, you're in the machine in which you live a vibrant life as a 30 year old double Nobel Prize recipient in Economics and Literature, but you find out that, were you to unplug, you would be a 60 year old work-a-daddy suffering from loneliness, moderately low income and mild bout of diphtheria. Would you leave?
Posted by: Rue Des Quatre Vents at Aug 2, 2006 9:33:57 AM
Of course, this type of thought experiment has been replayed in college dorm rooms and freshman philosophy classes for some time now. Usually there's an additional catch: Once you enter the "happiness box", you cannot leave.
The interesting thing I found in this experiment wasn't the conflict between hedonism and authenticity; rather, it was how powerful the theory of mind influenced choice.
The thing that would keep me out of the box, for instance, is not the desire for authenticity. I assume that the box provides an experience so real that the experience of authenticity would be satisfied.
The thing that keeps me out of the box is my obligation to other minds. My obligation to family, friends, children, etc. are the things that keep me out of the box. My imagination bringing up images of my wife, mother, father, sisters and brothers, visiting a dreaming vegetable and longing for interaction.
I hadn't realized until this experience how central and important the theory of minds is to my own decision-making process.
Kilroy Was Here
Posted by: Kilroy Was Here at Aug 2, 2006 9:50:59 AM
I think that it's absolutely clear in this case that in the "reversal test" version we would be foolish to leave.
Posted by: michael vassar at Aug 2, 2006 10:11:32 AM
I'm a libertarian deontologist, about as anti-consequentialist as one can get. But I don't think that utilitarianism is wrong because its fundamental premise - that we each desire our own happiness (however that is defined) - is incorrect, but because it treats people as means to an end, ignoring the fundamental differences between individuals, among whom "no moral balancing act can take place." (p. 33)
I'd plug in.
Posted by: Alex Harris at Aug 2, 2006 11:01:17 AM
To my mind the biggest downside is the possibility of mechanical failure. If the machine breaks, especially after a long time, I don't return to my real life in progress, I return to a world I haven't even been truly inhabiting. My family, friends, and worldly possessions are for all intents and purposes gone.
So to me, it's more of a perception-of-small-probabilities-of-horrific-events quandary.
Posted by: Noah Yetter at Aug 2, 2006 11:24:55 AM
Here's my reply:
http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/08/02/cowen-on-the-experience-machine/
Posted by: Will Wilkinson at Aug 2, 2006 11:31:13 AM
Hi there, Alex.
The experience machine discussion remind me of another discussion about how to judge people's welfare posthumously (I believe Parfit wrote something about this). One argument advances a non-experiential conception of welfare, from which it follows that a person's life can become worse after he is dead (if, say, his children become dropouts or drug addicts). This argument always seemed fairly untenable to me.
Authenticity seems to be valuable only as an ex post realization. Our ex ante judgments about authenticity always refer to our expectations about ex post feelings. (We would be angry if we found out we didn't really win a Nobel prize, etc.). If there were no chance that this discovery would happen, then, it seems almost indisputable that we ought to plug in.
One more argument - if it could be proven that the ex ante disutility from knowing you were giving up reality outweighed the positive utility from a great virtual life, then it could be argued that the experience machine is a bad choice. I doubt this is true for most people, though.
Posted by: Ray Seilie at Aug 2, 2006 11:32:18 AM
Tyler: You mentioned (the original version of) "The Vanishing" in your Favorite Things Netherlandish post last week - were you still thinking about it when you wrote this post?
Posted by: Dave Tufte at Aug 2, 2006 12:18:36 PM
the premise of the Matrix movies comes to mind; Joe Pantoliano's character in the first movie (dinner scene) and in response, the indian family in the third movie
Posted by: anon at Aug 2, 2006 1:10:21 PM
this question demonstrates nothing about what people actually prefer, instead only demonstrating what people want to think they would prefer or want others to think they would prefer. that is, until there's actually a million dollars on the table, any response to what one would do for a million dollars has nothing to do with what one would actually do for a million dollars, and everything to do with how one wants to appear, how one thinks one might respond, etc. similarly, until the box exists and we understand the constraints (does time run while your in the box? if not -- and it shouldn't -- why would anyone not enter the box?), the question doesn't really reveal much. let's be honest, if it really were the matrix, and it really would make life better, an enormous number of people would enter. it's not so different from watching movies, porn, playing video gamges, etc.
Posted by: dj superflat at Aug 2, 2006 2:26:39 PM
Start with these two questions:
Why would anyone bother to write a will?
Why on earth do we bother to honor them?
The answer is intuitively obvious- we care about what happens after we're gone, particularly to the people we care about. We form the habit of honoring wills because it's necessary for everyone to believe that their own will will be honored.
What's the relevance to Nozick's machine? Once you enter the machine, you've foreclosed all possibility of leaving anything lasting behind you. This is why the gut-reaction to this choice is that it would be "empty" or "meaningless". Wanting to leave a lasting mark on the world (for most people the most lasting thing they leave is their children), and the desire to be remembered for something are powerful emotions, for which people have often risked their lives.
Sure, if the machine made you forget the real world, then you're sort in Matrix-land (someone mentioned Joe Pantoliano's character- remmeber his vehement insistence that he have no recollection of his decision). If someone knocked you out and you woke up in one, well then you'd have no way of knowing the difference and the decision is moot. However, when you're faced with the choice, you have choice A: much increased pleasure, but no chance whatsoever of leaving anything behind from this point on, or B: take your chances on the real world, with the expectation of lower pleasure and the possibility (but no guarantee) of leaving something behind or being remembered for something. Most people, we assume, would take B (Everquest and World of Warcraft are popular, but not that popular, and anyway work on the conceit that in someway, everyone else there is a real person). It could be rational for a number of people- what if you're old and childless, say? But if you have the bulk of your life in front of you, you'd probably rather take your chances with reality.
Should we page Robert Barro about inheritance choices?
Posted by: Matt at Aug 2, 2006 2:30:21 PM
But don't you know?
You've already chosen to enter the machine, and the first experience is the decision not to -- you feel good about it.
Posted by: Ivan Kirigin at Aug 2, 2006 4:25:31 PM
You're assuming that "Tyler Cowen's life" is not already a single "thread" within some kind of "experience machine". Extended self-inquiry (often derided as "navel-gazing" by those who wish to avoid it) might lead to a different conclusion.
Posted by: Matthew Cromer at Aug 2, 2006 8:38:07 PM
Not true, Matt. You can be ok with writing a will without caring about what will happen after you die--just ask Epicurus. Make a will so that your sons will stop bothering you about who gets what. And honor others so that sucking up to dying people is worth it for yourself.
I've thought about this kind of question realistically a couple of times. MMORPG's can be pretty engrossing, and at least for those less social among us, fairly satisfying. You have friends, competition, adventure, property, etc. But there are some parts of the human experience it can't provide (sex, family). And like Noah said, one wrong bit and your accomplishments are destroyed.
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Posted by: levan at Sep 11, 2006 4:26:03 AM
