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Market Failure? Academic Departments
The Angry Professor describes a new budgeting system at LSU:
Several years ago LSU moved to a business model budget. Under this model, each department has control over its own funds. We might choose, for example, to give everyone a big raise. Or, we might choose to hire new faculty. We might purchase equipment, or furniture.
As with all such schemes, the administration makes sure that they will get money from somewhere to sustain their bloated salaries. Each department pays a "tax" to the college, which is determined by enrollments and indirects as earned in "Year Zero" (the year before the new budget took effect). If the department fails to generate at least the enrollments and indirects earned in this year, the college will take the shortfall out of the departmental budget. We're not talking about that funny fake money that colleges usually shuffle around, but real dollars: my raises.
Some good things have come out this arrangement:
My department and several others have taken advantage of the new model by "firing" the custodial staff provided by Physical Facilities and hiring a private contractor to keep the bathrooms looking spiffy. I must say, the bathroom has never looked cleaner, and my office carpet has been vacuumed for the first time in several years.
But, of course, the Angry Professor is angry.
In the social sciences, every department is trying to offer statistics courses in house, so we now have about 8 courses titled "Introduction to Statistics in [insert department name here]."
But why doesn't the Coase Theorem and comparative advantage apply? The problem here can't be the budgeting. I suspect a lack of property rights.
Each department is now in direct competition with every other for undergraduate enrollments.
Sounds good to me but the Angry Professor has a rebuttal:
The marginal departments, the ones with the lowest possible academic standards, are pulling in vast numbers of warm bodies and the tuition dollars associated with them. The departments that formerly only provided degrees to the football players are now thriving.
But grade inflation and the incentive to take easy courses in easy departments is nothing new, the only difference is that now the easy departments have funding commensurate with enrollments. The bottom line, therefore, is that the angry professor is angry at the students for not choosing classes more wisely.
A better grading system that takes into account the fact that some departments and professors grade easier than others would help students to make better choices. It's not obvious to me, however, that on the whole the students aren't making rational choices.
Thanks to Tom Slee for the pointer. I hope to say more about his interesting new book, No one Makes You Shop at Wal-Mart, in the future. Contrary to the title it's about how markets fail, not a defense of Wal-Mart!
Posted by Alex Tabarrok on August 16, 2006 at 07:10 AM in Economics, Education | Permalink
Comments
From the Angry Professor's post:
It was hard enough to get department chairs to sign off on interdisciplinary grant proposals before, and now it's almost impossible. Each chair wants the indirects to go exclusively to his/her department, or they quibble for weeks over who is getting the larger percentage.
It appears that the Coase Theorem is failing to apply for the usual reason: transaction costs.
Posted by: The Other Brock at Aug 16, 2006 8:47:59 AM
The same thing happens with joint ventures. I wonder if the same mechanisms used there would work in academia.
Posted by: Andy at Aug 16, 2006 8:56:39 AM
I really think the incentive to take easy classes in easy departments is a symptom of general ed requirements. The first two years of undergraduate enrollment, give or take, are basically just a repeat of high school. I say let the individual departments have whatever requirements they wish for a degree, but eliminate the university-wide general requirements that make you waste a couple of years re-taking US History, basic biology, and some lame class in arithmetic.
There will still be some incentive to take easy courses from easy departments, sure, but at least students would not be forced to fill up essentially half of their collegiate experience with required courses that teach nothing and are generally used to pad the GPA.
Posted by: Timothy at Aug 16, 2006 10:35:58 AM
I have heard the same argument made the exact opposite way: that removing the "core requirement" (e.g., Western civ) has caused departments to compete for bodies (before they could depend on a stable enrollment due to gened requirements, and hence reduced requirements for entry-level courses. A prof out of Duke (in English?) made the point in a series of oped pieces.
Posted by: Andy at Aug 16, 2006 10:56:27 AM
There are colleges without core requirements? Most of them don't require specific courses, but do require some menu of course-types. Meaning that departments compete for bodies to fill seats by offering courses that qualify for the "core" of Science, Literature, Social Science &c. I think all of that is a total waste of time, just have the university require X hours, Y GPA and no more than Z that are Pass/Fail, let the departments sort it out from there.
I think that'd still leave departments competeing for bodies, but departments whose degrees were valued higher on the job market would have an advantage rather than departments whose easy classes met the multicultural requirement.
Posted by: Timothy at Aug 16, 2006 1:39:34 PM
I thought core requirements were put in place to assure students got a liberal (the classical definition) education. What does multicultural have to do with it?
Posted by: joan at Aug 16, 2006 3:59:18 PM
The University I work at adopted a similar budgeting scheme a couple years ago. This resulted in the liberal arts and science and math colleges merging. Science and math had a lot of grant funding, liberal arts didn't. But by combining the two, suddenly liberal arts gets to benefit from the grants that the physicists and biologists are pulling in.
Posted by: Susanna at Aug 16, 2006 4:26:22 PM
There's an easy solution to this: impose the same grade distribution on every department. If a bunch of slackers show up, they compete against each other and at least *some* will get bad grades. In addition, those who perform badly in tough departments can switch to easier ones and pushdown the worse students. (Some people say that's what happens when physics and math "failures" come to econ depts and end up superstars :) Comparative advantage rules!
Posted by: David Zetland at Aug 16, 2006 5:37:29 PM
There's an easy solution to this: impose the same grade distribution on every department. If a bunch of slackers show up, they compete against each other and at least *some* will get bad grades. In addition, those who perform badly in tough departments can switch to easier ones and pushdown the worse students. (Some people say that's what happens when physics and math "failures" come to econ depts and end up superstars :) Comparative advantage rules!
NB: the same solution works WITHIN depts, eg, solving the problem of an "easy" professor who attracts "too many" students from the tough professor teaching the same course in the same quarter.
This solution blocks grade arbitrage, but does nothing for quality of teaching. With competition, students would have an incentive to find their niche.
Posted by: David Zetland at Aug 16, 2006 5:40:50 PM
Hmm... I think a big part of the problem is the way indirects (in other words the overhead portion of grant money) are handled. If the faculty and departments were actually billed for services used and allowed to retain their indirects, things would probably come out much more efficiently.
For example, if I get a grant for a project that I drop into my lab, if, instead of giving up 50% of that grant to the university for overhead I simply retain that 50% for use in paying overhead costs like renting my lab space from the university and paying the electrict bill for said space I imagine things would get much better pretty quick. Likewise for central administration billing departments for services. Attribute the revenue to departments from tuition, and charge back simple well understood fees for central support. Let the department pay $x per student for administration etc.
Posted by: quadrupole at Aug 16, 2006 6:25:33 PM
Great post and great comments.
One observation: I assume tuition fees are fixed by the administration at some uniform rate. So this is a faux 'marketplace.' Different Departments are unable to charge higher prices for better quality product. Good students are unable to send a market signal that they are willing to make up the difference for high quality (demanding) courses that are losing bodies. The individuals responsible for this scheme don't know basic market economics, or the elements of marketing pricing strategy. Imagine if Toyota had to charge the same fixed (low) price for a new Lexus as a lemon of a used car. What would happen to the quality of automobiles?
Posted by: PJ at Aug 16, 2006 7:45:32 PM
I've made Slees point many times over at Jane Galts place, but the commenters there don't seem to ever understand it. After a while, I just gave up.
They refused to understand how your choices directly impact others choices, even when given simple practical real world examples, like the Walmart choice.
Posted by: mickslam at Aug 16, 2006 8:51:55 PM
Zetland writes:
"There's an easy solution to this: impose the same grade distribution on every department."
I'd suggest a better (and simpler) solution would be to require that all COURSES of 30 or more students award grade such that the average grade is at most a "C". Zetland's solution to "impose the same grade distribution" by department is too aggregated.
Alex's assertion that "It's not obvious to me, however, that on the whole the students aren't making rational choices" (in the absence of deterence measures against easy grading) is a clear indication to me that he has not been getting enough sleep. Get some sleep Alex!
Posted by: jim at Aug 16, 2006 9:47:01 PM
Well, if professors are worried about grade inflation, stop giving easy A's. You are the ones in control.
Couldn't departments survey the average grade professors give, adjust it for the quality of their students
(ie their GPA's in other departments. Then weight GPAs according to the difficulty of each professor taken.
So if you take a professor that gives easy A's, then you might not get in your final GPA an A grade. But
if now students complain about grade think what will happen when they cannot understand the formula for GPAS.
Posted by: RWP at Aug 17, 2006 3:05:16 AM
Interestingly, LSU's chancellor is Sean O'Keefe, the previous NASA Administrator. It's really too bad O'Keefe didn't try implementing something similar at NASA when he was its head.
Posted by: Neil H. at Aug 17, 2006 3:37:00 AM
I understand that "LSU" is an acronym for Large State University, and not the actual university in Baton Rouge.
Posted by: Andy at Aug 17, 2006 11:24:28 AM
RPW wrote "Well, if professors are worried about grade inflation, stop giving easy A's. You are the ones in control."
Yes true, and some departments are quite good about not inflating grades -- where I teach, the economics department consistently hands out "C" as the average grade. But not all departments are equally principled. The reason is that administrators have been relying to greater and greater extent upon student evaluations of teaching as THE WAY to assess the quality of instruction being provided; with "quality of instruction" being a determinant in salary adjustments the incentive are perverse.
Posted by: jim at Aug 17, 2006 5:35:03 PM
What we seem to have here is kids already so turned off to learning anything that they just want a degree without attaining any competence at all.
Too many products of modern public "education" that is more interested in social engineering and labeling any person who isn't "normal" as a psychiatric case, complete with debilitating drugs.
Posted by: Cassandra at Aug 18, 2006 4:43:53 AM
I spent some time in a University with a similar funding model, and I think the most significant barrier to this "market" working well is the lack of information/knowledge of the students.
The students taking introductory courses have never been to university before, they don't know that some courses are better/easier than others, and if they do know that then they still don't know which specific ones are good/bad/easy/hard/whatever. So what do they do? They either (1) take the version offered by their department, or (2) they ask their department.
Another issue: At our institution we wound up with a large department A realising that all "their" students were enrolling in a specific first year course at smaller department B, and taking a slice of funding with them. So department A set up a competing course, and then made their competing course a pre-requisite of for all their second-year courses, effectively mandating a large number of students into their potentially-inferior course, but keeping the funding. The particular case I am thinking of was motivated by financial concerns, but I can see that in other cases this behaviour could be academically justified (for example, if department B felt that department A should change the focus of their course). However, if department B has their funding tied to year 0 enrollments, they're in trouble.
Posted by: Gordon Paynter at Aug 19, 2006 7:57:09 AM
I'm sorry that I was out of town when my post was linked so that I couldn't participate in this discussion. Just a few points:
(1) I love the idea of disconnecting the grades from the class. This is how the British system works, and I am trying to implement it (at least for those courses for which it could be done most easily cf. statistics) within my own department. I have no illusion that I will succeed. Can you hear the students moaning already? "But I'm being graded by someone who didn't even teach the class! How do they know what we were taught?"
(2) The marketplace is false in a number of respects, one already pointed out by PJ. Another is that because we are a state school, we receive funding from the state as part of our overall operating budget. (The percentage of our total budget received from the state is less than 15%.) However, because the state is still, nominally, the "owner" of the university, the state legislature restricts the amount of tuition we can charge. Thus, not only can't a good department charge more per credit hour than a poor one, as a whole we are not permitted to adjust tuition upward to cover costs, never mind meet market demand.
(3) Not so long ago, LSU (not in Baton Rouge) was "open." The only requirement for admission was graduation from a LS high school. There is now a guard at the door, thank goodness, but the mentality remains. Eliminating the core requirement not only reinforces the technical school mentality our students are handicapped with, but such a move assumes that the students we attract have mastered the material in these courses which Alex correctly classifies as remedial. I am not angry because my students are choosing courses badly. I'm angry because they are woefully unprepared for college work, and because they don't give a damn about it. They hunt out the courses that guarantee them easy As because all they want is the diploma, not the true liberal arts education that a university used to provide. An astonishing fraction of my students can't even read.
Eliminating the core requirements under LSU's current budget model would mean that every department would attempt to offer writing, math, history, etc. in house. We'd do it badly, wasting a lot of time and resources along the way. Students should be taking lots of courses in departments outside of their majors. That's what a liberal arts eduction is supposed to be. There are trade schools for students who prefer not to.
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