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Mistakes in moral arithmetic
1. For reasons of practicality and cost, nations should in many cases devote more resources to their own citizens than to foreigners.
2. Once the costs mentioned in #1 are taken into account, foreigners are still "worth less" than citizens.
#2 does not follow from #1, that is a mistake in moral arithmetic. #2 is false.
Posted by Tyler Cowen on July 26, 2006 at 02:46 AM in Philosophy | Permalink
Comments
Tyler:
I think you need to give some examples to make clear what you are talking about. But if this another defense of "cosmopolitanism" versus "citizenism," then how about this?
1. For reasons of practicality and cost, individuals should in many cases devote more resources to their own family members than to strangers.
2. Once the costs mentioned in #1 are taken into account, strangers are still "worth less" than family members.
#2 does not follow from #1, that is a mistake in moral arithmetic. #2 is false.
Posted by: Steve Sailer at Jul 26, 2006 2:59:46 AM
Wrong.
The nation represents its citizens. To claim that a nation has a moral obligation to treat its citizens as well as non-citizens, implies the claim that everyone has the moral obligation to treat everyone else in the world the same way that they treat themselves (taking into account transaction costs of course).
The only way you could make that moral claim without hypocracy would be if you use all the personal wealth you have beyond what you need for survival in ways that you believe do the most good for the most people. If you can make that claim I'd like to hear it, but I don't know how you'll justify many trips for pleasure purposes.
Honestly, you treat yourself better than every person in the world with the possible exception of family or VERY close friends, so under what logic can you hold your nation to a higher standard?
Posted by: BillWallace at Jul 26, 2006 3:07:54 AM
Following up, if you wanted to make the claim while accepting the hypocracy, i.e. it's moral to do so, and I'm just not completely moral, then you're into philosophy, and a rather pointless exercise.
Posted by: BillWallace at Jul 26, 2006 3:10:19 AM
The valuable skepticism of economists about human motivations suddenly evaporates when economists start explaining their own motivations. No libertarian economist could listen with a straight face to an official in a socialist government explaining "Trust me, I'm making policy for the good of the people of my country." Yet the very same economists will solemnly swear that they only advocate policies for the good of all the people of the world (which is even more improbable) and that their own tastes and self-interests has zero to do with it. Nowhere is this more obvious than when economists who know very little about immigration start preaching on the subject.
What makes Tyler more interesting than most economists is that, with his intense aesthetic preoccupations, he often seems like a character out of an Oscar Wilde novel as interpreted by Camille Paglia.
Thus, when Tyler calls for the creation of Hispanic shantytowns in the U.S. because of all the good music they will produce (as he did in Slate, see http://isteve.blogspot.com/2006/04/i-could-see-this-one-coming.html ), well, that's pretty cool. Granted, it's demented and sociologically nonsensical (good music comes out of black shantytowns, not Mexican ones), but, still, it's cool in a cruel, decadent aesthete sort of way.
What's not cool, unfortunately, is when Tyler then starts lecturing us on "moral arithmetic" as if that has much at all to do with what's motivating his views on immigration.
Posted by: Steve Sailer at Jul 26, 2006 3:25:28 AM
There is such a thing as an impersonal moral point of view. It is fine to argue that the world would collapse if we each tried to take care of each other's families; that is #1. One (not my view) also might argue that at "some levels of morality" our moral obligation is stronger to friends and family. But our behavior would still be wrong from the impersonal point of view and we should admit as such, especially when we are actively imposing harms on distant others. Keep also in mind that our ties to family and friends are quite real. I consider myself a patriot, but for pragmatic reasons. Most of the people in Washington do not please me. Governments are convenient fictions, not ultimate sources of moral delineation.
p.s. also beware when the argument against cosmopolitanism is simply a reductio, rather than a positive argument for national borders as ultimate sources of moral delineation. The latter is very very hard to make in palatable fashion. The difficulties of reconciling common sense morality with utilitarianism, while real, do not help much on the national borders question.
Posted by: Tyler Cowen at Jul 26, 2006 3:28:41 AM
Tyler says "But our behavior would still be wrong from the impersonal point of view and we should admit as such"
Which is exactly what I said " i.e. it's moral to do so, and I'm just not completely moral".
And like I said, now it's just a philophical argument. Your argument is based on Pure Utilitarianism. In fact it uses it as an assumption. Since pure utilitarianism is not the dominant philosophy of the world (there is none, obviously), it should not be used as a given, or an unstated assumption. Your argument needs to start with 'Given that I believe in utilitarianism.... '
Under any philosophy that doesn't include utilitarianism, your argument falls apart trivially.
Posted by: BillWallace at Jul 26, 2006 3:39:07 AM
Why the mealy caveat "in many cases"? Should governments for reasons of practicality and cost devote more of their resources to their citizens or not?
What is the special meaning of "worth less" that emerges when it is lodged in between quotation marks?
Worth less to whom?
Posted by: MTC at Jul 26, 2006 3:41:28 AM
Tyler's normally lucid prose style has collapsed into Hegel-like vagueness. This may not be an accident. Whenever the subject turns to immigration, Tyler's usually sharp insight turns dull and clouded by arational emotions.
Posted by: Steve Sailer at Jul 26, 2006 5:25:25 AM
"they only advocate policies for the good of all the people of the world (which is even more improbable) and that their own tastes and self-interests has zero to do with it."
Are you claiming that a much looser immigration policy would not be a net
benefit to all those affected?
Posted by: stuart at Jul 26, 2006 7:24:46 AM
I take it that the 'reasons of practicality and cost' are solutions to co-ordination problems: each state, knowing that all other states are doing the same, is better off devoting more resources to its own citizens than those of others. These may be credible reasons -- but are they likely to justify the degree to which rich states favour their own members over poorer ones today?
If the reasoning behind 1 is "(a) states should act in paradigms that makes everyone better off, and (b) everyone would generally be better off if there is a paradigm according to which each state favours its own", then on its own terms 1 seems to warrant rich states paying rather a lot of attention to the citizens of poor states, since (b) holds more the less inequality there is, and presently there is a lot of inequality.
Posted by: chris at Jul 26, 2006 8:29:15 AM
Talk of the "nation" as if it had an existence independent of the people and their government leads to foggy thought.
Let's just step back to Locke, Madison, et. al. and remember that the people elect their representatives to act in their behalf.
The people who vote are the ones to whom the representatives are responsible. They are not responsible to foreigners.
Tyler may argue that the average voter wants massive immigration of high-school dropouts. There is no doubt that Tyler does, but I doubt that the average voter does and their view should prevail.
Posted by: Robert Hume at Jul 26, 2006 8:35:10 AM
Does this mean Tyler Cowen is going to adopt 12 year old Romanian children instead of having his own?
Posted by: bjk at Jul 26, 2006 9:23:52 AM
If you swallow the whopper that the only reason nations strive for the welfare of their *own* citizens is 'practicality and cost', why then yes of course it makes perfect sense.
As for the 'impersonal moral point of view', I think you might find that not everyone acknowledges that there is such a thing; but even those who do might point out that, being individual people, they don't have an obligation to act in accordance with the beliefs of this hypothetical moralist.
As for government being a convenient fiction - I agree that the US government has no special moral status; however, as the federal government does not permit other government or private entities within the US to control the entry of people to areas they own or control, it is the actor we end up focusing on.
Posted by: bbartlog at Jul 26, 2006 9:31:25 AM
Tyler, if you are arguing from an Utilitarian perspective (as you seem to be), why isn't this just obvious?
Also, I don't think it is a good argument to say that Tyler or any other utilitarian cannot perfectly live up to that standard. We are all hypocrits in real life. Out personal motivations will inevitably get in the way. That same argument could be used to rule out any ethical theory (unless you define what is right as "whatever I do").
Posted by: Popp at Jul 26, 2006 9:55:41 AM
How on earth can there be such a thing as "moral arithmetic"? What next? Moral physics?
Posted by: Ahrimahn at Jul 26, 2006 10:00:56 AM
Does this mean Tyler Cowen is going to adopt 12 year old Romanian children instead of having his own?
Anything that stops Tyler from reproducing would indeed be preferable.
Posted by: Ahrimahn at Jul 26, 2006 10:03:32 AM
Several people seem to be saying: since democracy is right, the views of the state towards foreigners should be the view of the citizens towards foreigners, and in fact citizens do prefer their fellow members to others, therefore the state should prefer its own members to others.
Fine. But the question is, are people right? *Should* citizens individually favour members of their own state to those of others? It's no good to say that we live in democracies and in fact people do prefer X not Y. The issue just is whether Y is in fact superior.
I saw Ann Coulter on tv a few weeks ago. Each time the interviewer asked her an awkward question, she responded along the lines 'my book is no. 1 on the bestseller list'. Supposing all Coulter-book-buyers agree with her views (there are indeed a lot of them), there is still the question, Is she right?
Posted by: chris at Jul 26, 2006 10:18:19 AM
I'm hopelessly confused on this one. Tyler, do you mean that #1 is true but #2 is false? What do you mean by saying foreigners are "'worth less'"? Are you saying that yes, in practice, nations should take care of their own, but that we shouldn't confuse that practical contstraint with a moral statement judgement of ultimate worth? My conclusion is that philosophy is tough to do in a 2-sentence blog post.
For what it's worth, I think I agree with you that all people are of equal intrinsic worth regardless of nationality. But I do think nations have moral weight, for the same reason that I think contracts have moral weight. I do things all the time to help my company's shareholders, and I do so because I made a promise to do so, not simply out of self-interest. Likewise, I am bound to the United States by both implicit and explicit promises, and by a debt to everyone who has died for my freedom (all of whom were either immigrants or the descendants of immigrants).
Posted by: DK at Jul 26, 2006 10:20:22 AM
Rather than get emotive about it, consider Tyler's observation. Regardless of why, if governments spend more of their resources on citizens rather than foreigners, ceterus paribus a foreigner is actually going to be more valuable than a native.
Let's suppose that we have a native and a foreigner, Bob and Rajib, respectively. Further, let's suppose that they have some gross utility value for the community and that this value is equal for both of them, call it A. In an extreme case the government of Bob's country will have spent some amount on Bob and nothing on Rajib, so let's call what was spent on Bob x.
It follows that the net utilty for Bob would be A-x where the net utility for Rajib would be A. Granted, this is an extreme case, so let's suppose that the government of Bobistan also spent some amount y on Rajib once he immigrated. Now we have Rajib's net utility as A-y and Bob's as A-x. So long as y
Tyler's point was, I believe, that most people tend to think Rajib for some inherent reason presents less utility than Bob even where x>y and even where Rajib presents the same objective abilities as Bob. That is, natives tend to overvalue the skills and abilities of other natives relative to the skills and abilities of foreigners; or to assume that there is some other factor that reduces the utility of a foreigner such that x is irrelevant. This isn't true, was the point.
Posted by: Timothy at Jul 26, 2006 10:21:29 AM
I have no interest in the "impersonal moral point of view," because I am not an imperson. Things may be different where you come from, but on this planet my brother is worth more -- to me! -- than you are. That is just the way things work here, and any theory of morality that doesn't acknowledge this is alien to human nature.
Posted by: JB at Jul 26, 2006 10:22:32 AM
"like a character out of an Oscar Wilde novel as interpreted by Camille Paglia."
Knowing Tyler, that is one of the funniest things I've ever read.
Posted by: Will Wilkinson at Jul 26, 2006 10:24:10 AM
The end of my second paragraph should be "So long as y is less than x, Rajib presents a higher net utility. Where x and y are equal, there's no difference between Rajib and Bob."
HTML mussed things up.
Posted by: Timothy at Jul 26, 2006 10:24:21 AM
Steve Sailer: "No libertarian economist could listen with a straight face to an official in a socialist government explaining "Trust me, I'm making policy for the good of the people of my country." "
The key word in that sentence is 'socialist'. It is not their motives that Libertarians necessarily oppose, but their means. Benevolence in itself does not lead to policy failure.
For a moral argument for immigration, see Bryan Caplan's post here: http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2006/07/what_we_owe_imm.html
And anything that stops Ahrimahn from making childish comments would indeed be preferable.
Posted by: Jake at Jul 26, 2006 10:27:17 AM
Also, Tyler is making perfect sense. If Sailer thinks he's not being as lucid as usual, then that's just because Sailer doesn't understand moral theory as well.
Both points of Tyler's post are straightforward consequences of a very common form of utilitarianism. If you have a problem with utilitarianism, fine. But then address your argument there.
As a matter of fact, I do have a problem with utilitarianism, in part because it's not really as egalitarian as proponents make it out to be. It can't really account for the equal moral worth of individuals.
Tyler is right with a vengeance about national borders as a source of moral delineation. Perhaps you see the state as something grander than a tax and public goods jurisdiction. If so, explain.
Posted by: Will Wilkinson at Jul 26, 2006 10:54:13 AM
The nation represents its citizens.
More properly, isn't that, "The nation is its citizens?" I mean, I suppose one can reject the importance of larger community identity. And certainly the United States has a much more haphazard and attenuated sense of national identification and identity than, say, Japan or Korea. But the notion that a "nation" is separable from its actual citizens strikes me as potty. Now, the state certainly is (witness, e.g. most modern dictatorships) but the state is not really a moral actor in and of itself.
When you say:
1. For reasons of practicality and cost, nations should in many cases devote more resources to their own citizens than to foreigners.
I think you have got it largely wrong. Certainly my nation (the United States) doesn't allocate resources on the basis solely of practicality and cost. If I get in trouble in a foreign country, my expectation (hopefully not to be betrayed) is that when I ask for the American Consulate or the Embassy, they will expend resources, at a great distance beyond the mere territorial boundaries of the United States, to help me out, on account of my being an American citizen. It's certainly not practical, and it's probably not cost effective either. The practical and cost effective solution is simply to throw me to the foreign government. But that's one of the core benefits of citizenship. It's the thing stateless persons lack, no?
And similarly when Will Wilkinson says:
Tyler is right with a vengeance about national borders as a source of moral delineation. Perhaps you see the state as something grander than a tax and public goods jurisdiction. If so, explain.
My response is that even the attenuated idea of nationhood that the United States adheres to has that kind of relationship with its citizens. Some states go further -- Israel has gone much further on multiple occasions, e.g. actually sending in commandos to assist Israeli citizens who have got into trouble abroad, as at Entebbe. Empirically, nations clearly aren't just "tax and public good jurisdiction(s)"
Now, I suppose you all may be arguing that morally nation-states should not go to these kinds of efforts on behalf of their citizens, when those citizens are out of country. That is, that when you're inside these territorial borders, whether you're a citizen or not doesn't matter, and when you're outside those territorial borders, you're all the same, whether you're a citzen or not.
On the contrary, I think the territorial borders, as they delineate a territory, are of secondary importance -- the sovereign nation-state is a matter of its citizens first and foremost. It has the possession of certain territory, for the moment, and controls that territory to the benefit of its citizens (hopefully with a decent provision for non-citizens who happen to be in that territory). But it may not be -- we have historical examples like the Knights of Malta -- and certainly nations change their location and their borders from time to time, so that no particular point on the surface of the earth is innately associable with one particular nation or another (the present Levantine business notwithstanding).
Essentially, I suppose the question I'm seeing here is: "Do the nation's primary obligations flow to the territory it controls or the people who constitute it?" If you view a nation as a "tax and public goods jurisdiction," then it's obviously the territory. But why is that the (morally) correct view of the nation-state? That much I do not see.
Posted by: Taeyoung at Jul 26, 2006 11:48:55 AM
